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FINDING JUSTICE SCALIA IN BURMA:
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE
IMPEACHMENT OF MYANMAR’S CONSTITUTIONAL
TRIBUNAL
Dominic J. Nardi, Jr. †
Abstract: While the comparative courts literature has yielded valuable insights
into confrontations between political elites and judges, we still know relatively little
about if and how jurisprudential methodology affects the ability of constitutional courts
to survive such crises. How does the choice between originalism versus living
constitutionalism affect a court’s relationship with the other branches of government? Do
political elites tend to be more hostile towards certain methods of interpretation?
The 2012 impeachment of Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal presents an
interesting example of the interplay between jurisprudence and politics. After fifty years
of military rule, Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution produced a new civilian government that
appeared committed to political reform. However, when the Tribunal ruled that
legislative committees did not have constitutional status, the legislature impeached all
nine members, forcing them to resign. Less than two years after it was created, the
Constitutional Tribunal was essentially defunct.
This article argues that the
Constitutional Tribunal’s approach towards constitutional interpretation did not
ameliorate—and might have exacerbated—the crisis. Using a textualist or originalist
methodology, the Tribunal struck down national legislation in four out of the five cases it
heard. However, the Tribunal’s reasoning did not balance the legislature’s interests,
much less account for the dramatic political reforms. The Tribunal also never provided a
defense to its constitutional review power, and many legislators feared that the Tribunal
was usurping their newfound power. Had the Tribunal adopted a more flexible
approach—such as proportionality or living constitutionalism—it might have soothed the
legislature’s fears while still reaching similar policy outcomes.

I.

INTRODUCTION

While there has been considerable research on confrontations between
political elites and judges,1 we still know relatively little about if and how
jurisprudential methodology affects the ability of constitutional courts to
survive such crises. How does the choice between originalism versus living
constitutionalism affect a court’s relationship with the other branches of
government? Do political elites tend to be more hostile towards certain
†

Dominic J. Nardi, Jr. is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the University of Michigan Political
Science Department. He received his J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and a Masters in
Southeast Asian Studies from Johns Hopkins SAIS. The author would like to thank Sumit Bisarya,
Nicholas Cheesman, Melissa Crouch, Tom Ginsburg, Andrew Harding, Aung Htoo, Dr. Nay Win Maung,
Kyaw Zaw Naing, Eugene Quah, Kyaw Min San, David I. Steinberg, Nathan Willis, Khin Zaw Win, and
well as the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their comments and assistance.
1
See, e.g., Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 L. & SOC. REV.
87 (1996).
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methods of interpretation? Much of the judicial politics literature implicitly
assumes that political elites care largely, perhaps even exclusively, about the
policy outcomes of decisions and pay little attention to the way in which that
outcome is reached.2 However, if, as many judges claim, the chosen method
of constitutional interpretation helps determine a particular outcome,3 then
the two are inextricably linked. The method of interpretation might also
frame how political elites and the public at large view the court’s decision,
as well as influence the court’s ability to avoid charges of judicial activism.
This article looks at the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal of
Myanmar (Burma)4 before the impeachment of its members in August 2012.
At first, Myanmar might appear to be an odd choice for an article about
constitutional interpretation. Its 2008 Constitution has been heavily
criticized5 and the country is still in the early stages of a fragile political
transition. 6
However, despite these inauspicious beginnings, the
Constitutional Tribunal members soon issued several rulings declaring
government actions unconstitutional.7 Through its jurisprudence, this article
argues that the Tribunal developed a consistent—if not explicit—textualist
approach to constitutional interpretation. Moreover, the Tribunal’s approach
to interpretation seems to have exacerbated the response of the Legislature to
adverse decisions.
Part II of this article begins by reviewing the main theories of
constitutional interpretation and discussing the role of constitutional
ambiguity more broadly. Part III summarizes Myanmar’s history with
constitutional review, as well as key provisions of the 2008 Constitution.
Next, Part IV focuses on the structure and powers of the Constitutional
2

This is particularly true in the strategic institutionalist literature, which models the relationship
between the judiciary and executive branch. See infra note 53.
3
See infra note 24.
4
In 1988, Myanmar’s government changed the official English-language name of the country from
“Burma” to “Myanmar.” Most countries, as well as the United Nations, use “Myanmar.” However, some
Burmese pro-democracy activists and foreign governments still call the country “Burma.” See generally
Lowell Dittmer, Burma vs. Myanmar: What’s in a Name? 48 ASIAN SURV. 885, 885 (2008). In this article,
the term “Myanmar” is used not to indicate political sympathies, but rather to remain consistent with the
name of the country as written in the 2008 Constitution (Pyihtaungsu Thamada Myanmar Naingngandaw
or “Republic of the Union of Myanmar”). THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF
MYANMAR, May 29, 2008, ch. I, § 2 (Myan.).
5
See, e.g., David C. Williams, Lessons of Experience in the Enterprise of Constitutional Design:
Constitutionalism Before Constitutions: Burma's Struggle to Build a New Order, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1657
(2009); YASH GHAI, THE 2008 MYANMAR CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT (2008), available at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/2008_Myanmar_constitution--analysis_and_assessment-Yash_Ghai.
pdf.
6
See generally Lee Jones, The Political Economy of Myanmar’s Transition, 44 J. OF CONTEMP.
ASIA 144 (2014).
7
See, e.g., The Chief Justice of the Union v. Ministry of Home Affairs, [2011] No. 1/2011 (C.T.) 23
(Myan.), as well as other cases discussed in Section IV.C of this article.
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Tribunal and analyzes each of its five decisions. Part V uses this analysis to
draw broader conclusions as to the part that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence
might have played in the August 2012 impeachment crisis. Part VI
concludes with thoughts on potential amendments for the 2008 Constitution
that would set a clear standard of constitutional interpretation.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

This section provides a theoretical framework for understanding
constitutional interpretation. First, it discusses the causes of constitutional
ambiguity and the need for interpretation. Next, it discusses several of the
most important jurisprudential approaches to constitutional interpretation,
including textualism, originalism, living constitutionalism, and
proportionality. While there has been little research into the interplay
between interpretative methodologies and political behavior, this section
concludes by arguing that theories of constitutional interpretation can in fact
influence judicial decision-making.
A.

The Role of Constitutional Ambiguity

While lawyers value clarity and certainty in the law, constitutional
drafters frequently leave key language ambiguous, sometimes deliberately.
The tradeoff between precise rules and vague standards in constitutions can
be characterized as “implicitly also a choice between legislative and judicial
rulemaking.”8 Drafters can either write clear provisions that require little
interpretation, such as a strict numerical threshold, or vague standards, such
as “reasonableness,” that must be interpreted by judges. According to Isaac
Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner's logic, precise constitutional rules represent
an ex ante attempt by constitutional drafters to anticipate and legislate for
certain types of legal disputes, whereas standards allow courts to apply the
constitution ex post facto.9

8

Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. OF LEGAL
STUD. 257, 261 (1974).
9
See id. at 273-74. The difference between rules and standards can be overstated. Judicial
precedent and stare decisis help lawyers predict how courts will apply standards to particular facts. In fact,
over time, the body of case law can take the form of precise rules. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). Nevertheless, as political scientists Jeffrey A.
Segal and Harold J. Spaeth demonstrate, judicial precedent does not seem to “bind” judges, especially
when it is so easy for lawyers to distinguish one fact pattern from another. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold H.
Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. OF POL.
SCI. 971 (1996).
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Ehrlich and Posner’s argument is based upon the assumption that
precision entails costs.10 A certain amount of flexibility is often necessary in
order to ensure that the application of the constitution furthers the goals of
the constitutional drafters. Excessive precision might lead to overdeterrence or under-deterrence of regulated political behavior because the
rule cannot properly prescribe a threshold that correctly anticipates the
decision-making process of political elites. 11 Constitutional drafters
foreseeably cannot regulate all eventualities with precision due to the
enormous variety of possible political behaviors and political actors.12 In
extreme cases, excessive precision could lead courts to perverse outcomes or
arbitrary decisions, as they try to apply a constitutional rule uniformly,
overlooking the differing incentives of different classes of political actors.
Precision also risks confining the relevance of a constitutional
provision to a certain time and place. For example, eleven of the seventyeight articles of Germany's 1871 Constitution detailed regulation of the
railroad and telegraph systems, but these systems are no longer pressing
concerns in the early 21st century.13 By contrast, the vagueness of the U.S.
Constitution’s Fourth Amendment prohibition against “unreasonable
searches and seizures” allows it to remain applicable as the technology
available to the police changes over time.14 Precise legal rules are even less
suited to jurisdictions with high levels of economic and social heterogeneity
or technological change because in such jurisdictions, it becomes more
difficult to anticipate how the rules will be applied in different contexts.15
On the other hand, constitutional drafters face a principal-agent
problem in ensuring that judges interpret the constitution in line with their
preferences. One solution is to constrain judicial discretion by writing
detailed laws.16 Precision limits the ability of agents to deviate from the
principal's preferences by “narrow[ing] the scope for reasonable
10

Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. OF LEGAL
STUD. 307, 307 (1994).
11
See id. at 331.
12
Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 413 (2000).
13
ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 86 (2009).
14
See, e.g., Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 40-41 (2001) (finding that the use of thermal imaging
technology to scan heat signatures from a marijuana farm violated Fourth Amendment rights).
15
See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 8, at 273-74. In fact, many scholars credit the common law
legal system for furthering economic growth because judge-made law is more flexible and can better
protect private property. See generally Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin
Matter?, 31 J. OF COMP. ECON. 653 (2003); Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q. J. OF ECON. 453 (2003);
Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
16
C.f., JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 11 (2002) (arguing that Congress uses detail in healthcare
legislation to constrain executive agencies).
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interpretation,” 17 except in novel or exceptional cases. At the opposite
extreme, countries that do not possess a mechanism for constitutional review
might feel less compelled to preempt future disputes with precise language
because the legislature can reinterpret or rewrite ambiguous provisions at
will.
This conventional wisdom has recently been challenged by empirical
research suggesting that drafters might prefer to establish stronger
constitutional courts when the constitution is more specific. 18 Political
actors and interest groups who demand specific provisions would need a
mechanism to enforce the constitution in order to effectuate the benefits of
their lobbying efforts.19 As the number of these concessions increases, the
number of stakeholders who have an interest in enforcing the constitutional
bargain also rises.20 Thus, constitutional drafters are more likely to authorize
constitutional review as a means of managing disputes, recouping costs, and
enforcing the constitutional bargain. 21
Indeed, the Comparative
Constitutions Project, a cross-national study of every constitution extant
since 1789, found that greater constitutional detail tended to extend the
expected lifespan of constitutions.22
B.

Theories of Constitutional Interpretation

Given that constitutional language is frequently ambiguous, how then
do judges interpret that ambiguity? Judges purport to take this question very
seriously, frequently allocating much of their decisions to explaining or
debating the finer points of interpretative methodologies.23 Some have even
become public apostles of particular approaches.24 Despite their differences,
17

Abbott, supra note 12, at 412; see also Jeffrey K. Staton & Alexia Romero, Clarity and
Compliance in the Inter-American Human Rights System (International Political Science Association,
Working Paper, 2011).
18
ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 87.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
The life expectancy of a constitution at the maximum level of detail is around 80 years, whereas
the life expectancy at the lowest level of detail falls to the teens. Id. at 141; see also Christopher W.
Hammons, Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American Preference for Short, FrameworkOriented Constitutions, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 837 (1999).
23
Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2003) (Scalia, J.) (using textual and
historical evidence to argue that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is not limited to the purpose of
keeping a “well-regulated militia”) with Heller, 554 U.S. at 687 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (interpreting
the Second Amendment through the purpose of keeping a “well-regulated militia” and proposing an
“interest-balancing” standard).
24
This is especially true in the U.S., where justices debate constitutional interpretation in public fora
and publish books on the subject. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, SCALIA AND
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most judges claim that their decision in a case is determined by their
methodological approach, not by their policy preferences.25 In other words,
judges claim that they only have discretion in choosing a methodology, not
in reaching particular case outcomes.26
Perhaps the most intuitive approach to constitutional interpretation is
textualism. Textualists argue judges should only consider the “plain
meaning” of a word and not consider outside sources, such as legislative
drafting history.27 Textualists evaluate the meaning of words based on the
standard of a “skilled, objectively reasonable” person.28 To a significant
extent, textualism downplays the extent of ambiguity in constitutions. The
approach rejects the notion that judges should consider the range of
meanings to which a term is reasonably susceptible, instead preferring the
“plain meaning” of the word.29
In many cases, constitutional language is too ambiguous to discern a
“plain meaning” when applied to actual cases.30 Moreover, words in legal
documents do not always have the same meaning as the dictionary or
colloquial definitions. 31 However, acknowledging ambiguity also risks
opening the door to unfettered judicial discretion. As such, other schools

GARNER'S READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2007).
25
See, e.g., id.; Antonin Scalia, Textualism and the Constitution, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY: A
READER IN AMERICAN POLITICS 288-90 (Bruce Miroff et al. eds., 2012).
26
Perhaps most famously when current U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts testified before Congress
that a judge’s role is to serve as an “umpire” and not to “make the rules.” Bruce Weber, Umpires v. Judges,
N.Y. TIMES, July, 11, 2008, at WK1.
27
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 24.
28
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 59, 65 (1988).
29
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Plain Meaning: Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory
Construction, 17 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 401-02 (1994). This is in contrast to Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1968) (finding that the
court’s role was to determine whether parol evidence was “reasonably susceptible” to a defendant’s
interpretation under the Uniform Commercial Code).
30
For example, the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protection against “unreasonable
searches and seizures” does not define the scope of “unreasonable.” Subsequent Supreme Court decisions
have clarified that searches and seizures without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless conducted
pursuant to certain delineated exceptions, such as hot pursuit or in loco parentis. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325 (1985).
31
For example, with the rise of interstate commercial activity during the Industrial Revolution, the
scope of Congress’ jurisdiction under the U.S. Constitution’s “Commerce Clause” became less clear. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Since the New Deal, court decisions have interpreted the clause as granting
Congress authority to regulate activities that do not necessarily fall within the dictionary definition of the
term “commerce.” See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (finding that Congress
could regulate civil rights because segregation affected interstate commerce); Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d
483 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that Congress could enact legislation to protect wildlife because in aggregate
wildlife could affect commerce).
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have attempted to establish rigorous and consistent rules for interpreting
constitutional ambiguity.
Originalists argue that judges should only interpret ambiguous
constitutional provisions based on how a reasonable person at the time of its
adoption would have interpreted the language. 32 This approach allows
judges to use historical evidence such as proceedings from a constitutional
convention in order to establish the historical validity of a particular
interpretation.33 United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argues
that originalism has a crucial function in a democracy in preventing judges
from usurping the authority of the legislature.34
Critics of originalism worry that it is impractical at best, and at worst
risks imposing outcomes that conflict with modern standards of justice.35 As
a practical matter, historical source materials might prove scant or, even
worse, biased.36 Many countries do not possess transcripts of public debates
surrounding the adoption of a new constitution in the manner of the U.S.
Federalist Papers. As a theoretical matter, critics of originalism argue that
law and legal norms evolve such that originalism risks imposing the
outdated views of past generations—the “dead hand of the past”—on future
generations.37
Proponents of living constitutionalism (or “active liberty”) argue that
judges must acknowledge the contemporary social and political norms and
values to inform their interpretation of the constitution.38 For example, in
the U.S. context, living constitutionalists would point out that a reasonable
person in 1789 would have excluded slaves, women, and many others from
the democratic system and Bill of Rights.39 It would be unreasonable and
undesirable to force judges in the 21st century to interpret terms such as
“property” in that context.40 Living constitutionalism does not mean that
judges are completely unconstrained. Rather, judges are constrained by the
underlying principles of the constitution, such as “freedom from government
32
33

See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: the Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856-57 (1989).
Ethan Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT 353, 356

(2007).
34

Scalia, supra note 32, at 854.
See Leib, supra note 33, at 358-59.
36
Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 159, 171-72 (2008).
37
Leib, supra note 33, at 358-59; DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (INALIENABLE
RIGHTS) 33-50 (2010).
38
See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
Speech at Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985).
39
BREYER, supra note 24, at 33.
40
Obviously, originalists do not go to this extreme this today, partly because the 14th, 15th, and 16th
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution have removed slavery from the text. Nevertheless, the example
serves to highlight in reductio one of the frequent criticisms of originalism.
35
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coercion,” and must interpret it in that context.41 Taking this approach a step
further, Professor John Hart Ely argues judges should actively interpret the
U.S. Constitution in a manner that enhances the ability of minority
populations to participate in democracy and prevents against a “majority
tyranny.”42
When constitutional interpretation involves complex policy or moral
questions, judges might use proportionality and balancing tests to weigh
competing interests.43 The exact criteria for making such assessments varies
by country. The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted tiers of scrutiny for
different rights, with the highest being strict scrutiny for laws that
discriminate on the basis of race (and arguably gender).44 In such cases, the
government must have a compelling interest in the policy and the means
adopted must be narrowly tailored towards that end.45 Amongst younger
constitutional courts, the proportionality test has become popular. 46
Proportionality requires that government infringements on rights 1) be for an
objective of sufficient purpose, and 2) the means chosen must be
“reasonable and just.”47 In assessing the means, courts consider if 1) there
exists a rational basis for the policy, 2) the government employed the least
restrictive means possible, and 3) the law’s objectives are proportional to the
constitutional harms it causes. 48 Notably, unlike the other methods,

41
42
43

See BREYER, supra note 24, at 3.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-8 (1981).
See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK V. TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 652 (6th ed.

2006).

44

See, e.g., Korematsu v. U.S, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that the government’s compelling
interest in preventing sabotage permitted it to detain Japanese Americans in internment camps).
45
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (finding that a state’s interest in education
was not a sufficiently compelling interest to require compulsory education for religious minorities).
46
For example, constitutional courts in Canada (R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.)), Israel
(HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov. of Isr. [2004] (Isr.)), Colombia (Corte Constitucional
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Mayo 10, 2006, Sentencia C-355/2006), and South Africa (South Africa v.
Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.)) have all used variants on the method. See generally Alec Stone Sweet
& Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L.
72 (2008).
47
See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, § 1 (U.K.) (making rights “subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”); S. AFR. CONST.,
1996, § 36 (noting that right can be limited only “to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom . . . ”); Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754-1994, 1454 SH 90 § 4 (Isr.) [hereinafter Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation (Isr.)] (guaranteeing freedom of occupation “except by a law befitting the values of the State of
Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required . . . ”).
48
Id.
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proportionality explicitly permits government infringement upon rights, but
bases its decision on the relative merits of that infringement.49
C.

Constitutional Interpretation in Practice

There has been insufficient research into the descriptive interplay
between interpretative methodologies and political behavior. Comparative
constitutional lawyers have studied the effect of different methods on
jurisprudential outcomes,50 but seldom extend their analysis to how other
political actors react to that methodology. By contrast, political scientists
tend to overlook jurisprudential choices. 51 Attitudinalists argue that
constitutional court judges are relatively unconstrained and thus can pursue
their policy preferences, using legal doctrine as a guise. 52 Strategic
institutionalists focus on the court's relationship with the other branches of
government as a constraint on judges’ ability to reach either their preferred
policy or jurisprudential outcomes.53 Neither believes that law alone has a
constraining effect on judicial behavior.
Other disciplines have attempted to demonstrate that legal language
can in fact constrain judges by influencing their perceptions on the extent of
their discretion. Psychological experiments on laypeople acting as jurors
find no evidence that different standards of review make the jurors
accordingly more or less likely to vote for conviction.54 Of course, judges—
or even lawyers—are socialized in law school and thus might treat legal
standards differently from a layperson. More recent research on U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeal has found evidence that judicial panels tend to be more
deferential towards agency decisions when applying the Chevron standard of
review than when applying the more probing Skidmore test. 55 While
49

See, e.g., R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.R. 713 (Can.) (acknowledging that
government regulations forcing shops to close on Sundays was a proportionate limitation on religious
freedoms).
50
See generally JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 43.
51
See generally Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261 (2006); Christian
Joerges, Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the Role of Law in the Process of European
Integration, 2 EUROP. L. J. 105 (2009).
52
Segal & Spaeth, supra note 9, at 973.
53
See generally Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Judicial
Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 43, 43-63 (1999); Mario Bergara, Barak
Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional
Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 247-79 (2003); GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REVIEW IN GERMANY (2005).
54
See Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and
Flexibility in Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y, & L. 769, 775 (2000).
55
In evaluating agency interpretations of statutes, the Skidmore test encourages judges to consider:
1) the thoroughness of the agency's investigation; 2) the validity of its reasoning; 3) the consistency of its
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standards of review are not equivalent to methods of constitutional
interpretation, they do both require judges to constrain their discretion based
on abstract legal standards. Of course, we cannot read the minds of judges
to know if they truly feel constrained by jurisprudential methodologies. To
obviate this problem, this article focuses on interpretative methods as
presented in the judicial decisions themselves and tries to avoid speculating
about the intent of the judges.
Judges decide to adopt a method of constitutional interpretation in a
variety of ways. In some cases, the constitution itself simply mandates a
particular standard of interpretation.56 In other cases, judges might borrow
legal reasoning from a foreign constitutional court if they find it particularly
persuasive.57 The choice of method might also depend on the individual
judge’s political and legal socialization. Increasingly, law students in
America are exposed to and filtered into “originalist” or “living
constitutionalist” camps. Finally, the age of the constitution might matter in
that courts interpreting a younger constitution might feel less concerned
about uncovering the intent of the original constitutional drafters because
they are of the same generation as those founders and implicitly understand
their views.58 However, as constitutions age, legal norms and the meaning of
words also change, which might prompt calls for a means to tether
interpretation back to the intent of the founders.

interpretation over time; and 4) any other persuasive powers of the agency. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944). By contrast, under Chevron, judges are instructed to apply a two-step test: 1) has
Congress has spoken directly to the question at issue; and 2) if not, is the agency’s construction of the
statute permissible? Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The latter test is designed to be much less
intrusive into the agency decision-making process because agencies can reach permissible interpretations
that might not necessarily be the “ideal” one. The authors of the aforementioned study argued that Chevron
constrains courts by giving judges in the minority of the panel who support deference greater leverage
against the majority. Morgan Hazelton et al., Panel Effects in Administrative Law: A Study of Rules,
Standards and Judicial Whistleblowing, (Univ. of S. Cal., 2011).
56
See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 1 (U.K.); S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 36; Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation (Isr.), supra note 47, at § 4.
57
U.S. v. Burns, [2001] S.C.R. 283 (Can.), citing Soering v. U.K., 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989).
58
In fact, constitutional drafters might end up serving on the bench as judges. In the American
context, Founding Father John Jay also served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. WALTER STAHR,
JOHN JAY: FOUNDING FATHER 273 (2005). The first chief justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court,
Jimly Asshiddiqie, served on the legislature’s Expert Advisory Secretariat during that country’s transition
from authoritarianism. See Profile Judge Jimly Asshiddiqie, MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI REPUBLIK
INDONESIA, http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.ProfilHakim&id=625 (last visited
Apr. 15, 2014).
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THE DECLINE OF BURMESE CONSTITUTIONALISM

Myanmar does not have a long tradition of constitutionalism. The
country’s first Supreme Court could exercise constitutional review, but after
the 1962 military coup the judiciary became subservient to the military.59
Fifty years of military rule made the political elite wary of checks on
government power.
This section briefly discusses the history of
constitutionalism in Myanmar, including previous constitutions and judicial
institutions. It then summarizes the 2008 Constitution and the political
reforms since the 2010 elections in order to provide context for the later
impeachment of the Constitutional Tribunal.
A.

Liberal Constitutional Spirit (1948-1962)

Myanmar had a relatively sophisticated pre-colonial judicial system, 60
but when Britain annexed the country in the 19th century, it implanted a
common law legal system.61 In April 1947, with independence looming,
Britain convened a constituent assembly in which Burmese politicians
drafted a new constitution.62 However, the majority party, the Anti-Fascist
People’s Freedom League (“AFPFL”), led by General Aung San, had little
interest in Western constitutionalism and rule of law.63 It also failed to find a
compromise that would satisfy the country’s ethnic minorities, several of
which had been promised autonomy by the British. 64 Soon after the
constitution went into effect, the Karen National Liberation Army and the
Communist Party of Burma separately launched insurgencies against the
Yangon government, nearly toppling it.65
The 1947 Constitution is the only Myanmar constitution to grant a
constitutional court meaningful independence. Under Chapter VIII of the
Constitution, the president appointed Supreme Court judges in consultation
59

Nick Cheesman, How an Authoritarian Regime in Burma Used Special Courts to Defeat Judicial
Independence, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 801, 801-06 (2011).
60
THANT MYINT-U, THE MAKING OF MODERN BURMA 87-88 (2001); see also Myint Zan, Woe Unto
Ye Lawyers: Three Royal Orders Concerning Pleaders in Early Seventeenth-Century Burma, 44 AM. J. LEG.
HIST. 40 (2000).
61
Myint Zan, Judicial Independence in Burma: No March Backwards Toward the Past, 1 ASIANPAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 10 (2000).
62
ROBERT H. TAYLOR, THE STATE IN MYANMAR 249 (2009).
63
Aung San announced several basic principles for the constitution, including sovereignty, equality,
democracy, and socialism, but notably did not mention the rule of law. See MAUNG MAUNG, BURMA’S
CONST. 81-82 (2d ed. 1961). In fact, Dr Maung Maung later described the 1947 Constitution as a quick
“cut and paste affair,” suggesting that the drafters focused on basic principles. Maung Maung, Dr E Maung,
in DR MAUNG MAUNG: GENTLEMAN, SCHOLAR, PATRIOT 243, 248 (Robert H. Taylor ed., 2008).
64
SHELBY TUCKER, BURMA: CURSE OF INDEPENDENCE 120-21 (2001).
65
Id. at 222.
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with the Chief Justice of the Union and the Prime Minister, while Parliament
could confirm or reject them, dividing the appointment power between two
branches.66 Members of Parliament could hold an up-or-down vote, but by
custom refrained from criticism of nominees.67 Furthermore, justices could
be removed only for proved misbehavior or incapacity. 68 Parliament
separated the lower courts from the civil service in order to insulate judges
from executive influence.69 Judicial salaries were relatively high, especially
compared to those of other government officials.70
The 1947 Constitution explicitly authorized the Supreme Court to
exercise constitutional review and prohibited any attempt to circumscribe its
jurisdiction.71 The Supreme Court portrayed itself as a defender of individual
liberty and interpreted the Constitution in a “large, liberal, and
comprehensive spirit.”72 During the civil war after independence, the Court
announced that the writ of habeas corpus could not be suspended, even
during a state of emergency. 73 It even assumed authority to review
presidential actions whenever he acted in a quasi-judicial manner.74 The
Supreme Court established itself as a veto player in the new government by
adopting the constitutional “construction most beneficial to the widest
possible amplitude of [the court’s] powers.” 75 While the government
frequently criticized these decisions, it did not violate the Court’s
independence.76
For Myanmar’s current opposition parties, the 1947 Constitution
represents the high watermark of liberal constitutionalism. However, as
Yangon suffered from various political and military crises, many politicians
saw the 1947 Constitution and constitutional review as contributing to,
rather than solving, the country’s problems. The military, including General
66

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA, Sept. 24, 1947, ch. VIII, § 140 (Myan.) (repealed in
1974) [hereinafter MYAN. CONST. (1947)].
67
Maung, supra note 63, at 147.
68
MYAN. CONST. (1947), supra note 66, at ch. VIII. § 143.
69
See Maung, supra note 63, at 156-57.
70
The salaries for judges ranged from MMK 2500 for a High Court judge to MMK 3500 for the
Supreme Court Chief Justice, compared to MMK 1700 for government ministers. Maung Maung, The
Search for Constitutionalism in Burma, in DR. MAUNG MAUNG: GENTLEMAN, SCHOLAR, PATRIOT 507,
512-13 (Robert H. Taylor ed., 2008).
71
MYAN. CONST. (1947), supra note 66, at ch. VIII. § 137. The Supreme Court could also issue
advisory opinions at the request of the president. Id. At § 151(1).
72
See U Htwe (alias) AE Madari v. U Tun Ohn & One, [1948] B.L.R. 541 (S.C.) 542 (Myan.).
73
Nick Cheesman, The Incongruous Return of Habeas Corpus to Myanmar, in RULING MYANMAR
FROM CYCLONE NARGIS TO NATIONAL ELECTIONS 90, 95 (Nick Cheesman et al. eds., 2010).
74
U San Win v The Secretary, Ministry of Judicial Affairs, [1957] B.L.R. 84 (Myan.).
75
U Htwe (alias) AE Madari v U Tun Ohn & One, [1948] B.L.R. 541 (S.C.) 542 (Myan.).
76
See Nick Cheesman, Thin Rule of Law or Un-Rule of Law in Myanmar? 82 PAC. AFF. 597, 600-01
(2009-2010).
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Ne Win, felt the Supreme Court under the 1947 Constitution was too
independent.77 Other politicians accused the judiciary of being out of touch
with the needs of the country and too focused on the interests of the private
bar association.78 Dr. Maung Maung, who served as Chief Justice from
1965-71 and later as Judicial Minister, criticized the pre-1962 judiciary for
making Myanmar’s citizens more litigious and for favoring the “capitalist
classes.”79 While the Supreme Court struck down many executive actions, it
never declared a legislative act ultra vires,80 suggesting apprehensiveness
about testing its power against the legitimacy of popularly elected
representatives.
B.

Socialist Constitutionalism (1962-1988)

The Myanmar military (tatmadaw) became increasingly powerful
during the late 1950s, when the AFPFL proved too polarized to govern
effectively. 81 At Prime Minister U Nu’s request, the military briefly
governed the country for eighteen months (1958-60).82 In February 1962,
ethnic minority leaders from Shan and Kayah States met in Rangoon to
discuss options for greater autonomy.83 On March 2, General Ne Win seized
power and arrested Prime Minister U Nu, Chief Justice Myint Thein, and
key ethnic minority leaders.84 Unlike the earlier caretaker administration, the
new Revolutionary Council (“RC”) abolished most of the major institutions
established under the 1947 Constitution.85 Ironically, the country’s ethnic
insurgencies continued and even intensified.86

77

One of his main criticisms was that the constitution forbade the government from changing judges’
salaries without consent. Zan, supra note 61, at 13.
78
Historian J.S. Furnivall noted that given the Chief Justice’s influence on the judicial
nomination process, all justices tended to be recruited from amongst the narrow legal elite, and as such,
“the Bench tends to assume the character of a self-perpetuating closed corporation.” See J.S. Furnivall,
Foreword, in Maung, supra note 63, at ix–xi.
79
MAUNG MAUNG, GENERAL LAW KNOWLEDGE (1975).
80
Zan, supra note 61, at 15.
81
See MARY CALLAHAN, MAKING ENEMIES: WAR AND STATE BUILDING IN BURMA 184-88 (2005).
82
Id.
83
Some historians allege these states sought to secede from the Union and claim independence, an
option they could exercise under Chapter X of the 1947 Constitution after 10 years. MYAN. CONST. (1947),
Sept. 24, 1947, ch. X. §§ 201-02 (Myan.) (repealed in 1974). Also, at this time Prime Minister U Nu was
considering nationalizing some of the military’s key industries and was thus threatening the military’s economic
autonomy. See DAVID. I. STEINBERG, BURMA: A SOCIALIST NATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 73-74 (1982).
84
Myint Thein was imprisoned until 1968, several years longer than even U Nu. Maung Maung, U
Myint Thein, Chief Justice of the Union, in DR. MAUNG MAUNG: GENTLEMAN, SCHOLAR, PATRIOT 253–64
(Robert H. Taylor ed., 2008).
85
Zan, supra note 61, at 17-19.
86
See generally TUCKER, supra note 64.
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These developments boded ill for the judiciary. As supreme leader,
Ne Win proceeded to emasculate the judiciary. On March 30, he abolished
the Supreme and High Courts and replaced them with the Chief Court.87 Far
from using constitutional review in a manner “beneficial to the widest
possible amplitude of its power,”88 this new court allowed its power to issue
writs and exercise judicial review fall into desuetude.89 The Chief Court
rejected Myanmar’s British common law heritage by directing judges to
accord greater priority to Buddhist Dhammathats, or law treatises, over
British statutes. 90 The RC also established separate special criminal
tribunals dominated by military appointees to hear politically sensitive
cases.91 The Special Criminal Courts Appeal Court (“SCCAC”) rulings
bound not only lower special criminal tribunals, but also the regular
judiciary.92 At least one member of the SCCAC was also a member of the
RC,93 effectively demolishing the barrier between the executive branch and
the judiciary. Overall, the new judicial system allowed the tatmadaw to
consolidate its power and marginalize judges.94
Far from a temporary expedient, the military used these special
tribunals as a model for the rest of the judiciary. In the early 1970s, the
Revolutionary Council transferred authority to the Burma Socialist
Programme Party (“BSPP”) and promulgated the 1974 Constitution.95 The
BSPP replaced the regular courts with a system of “People’s Courts,” which
in turn resembled the special criminal tribunals.96 All judges were required
to be members of the BSPP and they took guidance from BSPP Township
Councils, rather than court’s legal advisors. 97 The 1974 Constitution
explicitly required judges to “protect and safeguard the Socialist system.”98
At the apex of the judicial system, the Constitution created the
Council of People’s Justice (“CPJ”) to replace the Chief Court.99 This new
institution was directly responsible to the Pyithu Hluttaw, the legislature,
87

Cheesman, supra note 59, at 807.
U Htwe (alias) AE Madari v. U Tun Ohn & One, [1948] B.L.R. 541 (S.C.) 542 (Myan.).
89
See ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, Ne Win, Maung Maung and How to Drive a Legal System
Crazy in Two Short Decades, 7 ARTICLE 2 15, 19–20 (2008)
90
Andrew Huxley, The Last Fifty Years of Burmese Law: E Maung and Maung Maung, 1998
LAWASIA 9, 16–17.
91
See generally Cheesman, supra note 59.
92
Maung Chit v. Union of Burma, [1972] B.L.R. (C.C.) 28 (Myan.).
93
Zan, supra note 113, at 19.
94
See generally Cheesman, supra note 59.
95
DAVID I. STEINBERG, BURMA: THE STATE OF MYANMAR 106-07 (2001).
96
See generally Cheesman, supra note 59, at 802, 808, & 817-818.
97
CHRISTINA FINK, LIVING SILENCE IN BURMA: SURVIVING UNDER MILITARY RULE 35 (2009).
98
MYAN. CONST. (1947), Sept. 24, 1947, ch. VII. § 101 (Myan.) (repealed in 1974).
99
Cheesman, supra note 59, at 818.
88
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and its members served in both bodies. 100 Burmese law prescribed no
minimum qualifications for CPJ justices, and most were former generals;101
during the first term, only one out of five CPJ members was a lawyer.102
Ultimately, the Constitution permitted only the Pyithu Hluttaw to publish
interpretations of the constitution.103 Although the Constitution provided for
individual rights, these fell entirely outside the CPJ’s jurisdiction and there
was no enforcement mechanism.104 In many cases, the judiciary also refused
to enforce individual rights under statutory law105 and judges no longer
accepted petitions for writs in criminal cases.106
C.

Constitutional Void (1988-2010)

By the summer of 1988, the BSPP regime faced widespread protests
in response to economic hardships caused by a massive devaluation of the
currency.107 The democratic opposition began to rally behind Aung San Suu
Kyi, daughter of General Aung San, and her National League for Democracy
(“NLD”) party.108 On September 18, the tatmadaw, fearing the BSPP had
lost control of the country, seized power.109 This new junta, the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (“SLORC”), initially presented itself as an
interim government and announced elections for May 1990.110 However,
when the NLD won over eighty percent of the seats, the SLORC refused to
hand over power and instead announced that the results would be used to
form a National Convention to draft a new constitution, not a parliament.111
Soon after taking power, the SLORC—later the State Peace and
Development Council (“SPDC”)—declared martial law and announced that
it was “not bound by any Constitution.”112 Between June 1988 and March
100

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA Jan. 3, 1974, ch. V, § 73(d) & ch. VII, § 104
(Myan.) (repealed in 2008) [hereinafter MYAN. CONST. (1974)].
101
See id. at ch. V, § 73(d), ch. VII; see also Council of People’s Justices Law, 1974, No. 13/1974
(Myan.).
102
Zan, supra note 61, at 23.
103
MYAN. CONST. (1974), supra note 100, at ch. XVI, § 200(c).
104
Cheesman, supra note 73, at 96.
105
For example, the Safeguarding Citizens’ Rights Law, 1975, No. 2/1975 (Myan.) allowed citizens
to lodge complaints against state officers but, it does not appear that any cases were ever brought under this
law. Cheesman, supra note 73, at 108-09 n.15.
106
Id. at 96. The People’s Courts system was plagued with other problems as well, including
corruption and massive case backlog. TAYLOR, supra note 62, at 339-42.
107
STEINBERG, supra note 95, at 4-12.
108
JUSTIN WINTLE, PERFECT HOSTAGE: A LIFE OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI, BURMA'S PRISONER OF
CONSCIENCE 287-93 (2008).
109
Id. at 282.
110
TAYLOR, supra note 62, at 393.
111
Id. at 395-414.
112
State Law and Order Restoration Council Law Order, 1990, No. 1/1990 (Myan.).
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1989, the military closed the courts and replaced them with military
tribunals in order to try political cases.113 Like its predecessor, once the
SLORC consolidated power, it relied less on military tribunals and more on
ordinary courts. On September 26, it formally abolished the People’s Courts
and appointed professional judges.114 The SLORC appointed five justices to
the new Supreme Court, including former court Registrar U Aung Toe as the
Chief Justice.115 In the lower courts, the SLORC replaced lay judges with
professional lawyers. 116 Under a revised version of the Judiciary Law
published in 2000, the Supreme Court also gained responsibility for
appointing lower court judges.117
The SLORC restored the pre-1962 judicial system in form, but not in
spirit. Although § 2(a) of the Judiciary Law nominally protected judicial
independence,118 the junta dismissed judges without formal impeachment
proceedings on multiple occasions.119 The lack of judicial independence
undermined the right to a fair trial; according to Steinberg, “[t]rials [were]
usually secret, sentences perversely long (and extendable at the state’s
command), and prison conditions deplorable.”120 The Myanmar Code of
Criminal Procedure nominally ensures judicial oversight of arrests,121 but
former political prisoners claimed that they lacked an opportunity to
challenge lawfulness of their arrest, much less enforce their constitutional

113
114
115
116
117

K.S. VENKATESWARAN, ARTICLE XIX: BURMA BEYOND THE LAW 26–29 (1996).
State Law and Order Restoration Council Law (Judiciary Law), 1988, No. 2/1988 (Myan.).
State Law and Order Restoration Council Law Order, 1988, No. 5/1988 (Myan.).
TAYLOR, supra note 62, at 452–53.
State Law and Order Restoration Council Law (Judiciary Law), 2000, No. 5/2000, ch. VI, § 13

(Myan.).
118

Id. at ch. II, § 2(a).
In 1988, the SLORC dismissed 62 judges for failing to imprison political prisoners to terms longer
than the sentences prescribed by statute. State Law and Order Restoration Council Law Order, 1988, No.
5/1988; BURMA LAWYERS’ COUNCIL, BURMA JUDICIAL INTERVENTION: CONTRIBUTION FOR THE 58TH
SESSION OF THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, (Apr. 2002), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/
obl/docs/chr2002briefing-judicial.htm; ASIA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN BURMA 12 (1990). On November
14, 1998, 64 judges, including five Supreme Court justices, were “permitted to retire.” State Peace and
Development Council Order, 1998, No. A.0694(I)/1998 (Myan.).
In 2009 Tomas Ojea Quintana, UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Myanmar, bluntly stated:
“There is no independent and impartial judiciary system.” UN Rights Envoy Says Burma's Judiciary
System Flawed, MIZZIMA NEWS, Nov. 13, 2008, http://archive-2.mizzima.com/news/world/1291-un-rightsenvoy-says-burmas-judiciary-system-flawed.html; see also Special Rapporteur on the Situation of
Human Rights in Myanmar, United Nations Human Rights Comm’n, Progress Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, M ar. 10, 2010, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/48
(2010), ¶ 42 (by Tomás Ojea Quintana); Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Aug. 24, 2009, U.N. Doc. A/64/318 (2009), ¶¶ 22, 36-37 (by Tomás
Ojea Quintana).
120
DAVID I. STEINBERG, BURMA/MYANMAR: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 130 (2013).
121
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, ch. V, §§ 60–61 (Myan.).
119
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rights.122 Furthermore, judges could use their contempt power in order to
compel lawyers who defended political prisoners to instruct their clients not
to resist the proceedings.123 Amnesty International even reported that in
sensitive cases judges took sentencing instructions directly from Military
Intelligence officers.124
D.

Drafting the Constitution (1990-2008)

Some of the winners from the May 1990 election joined the National
Convention, but the SLORC diluted their voice by appointing hundreds of
delegates to “represent” interest groups, such as peasants, workers and
ethnic minorities.125 When the convention began in January 1993, only 99
of the 702 delegates had been elected.126 The entire process was plagued
with irregularities.127 Delegates’ statements had to be preapproved by the
chairman and they were not allowed to criticize the draft constitution.128 In
1995, the NLD boycotted the convention, and the SLORC adjourned it the
following year.129
The constitution-drafting process accelerated in the mid-2000s after
several high-profile confrontations between the government and the
opposition. In May 2003, the SPDC faced political crisis when a group of
thugs attacked Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade at Depayin.130 In response,
then-Prime Minister Khin Nyunt announced a “seven-step roadmap to
democracy” and reconvened the National Convention the following year.131
122

AMNESTY INT’L, MYANMAR: THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: GRAVE AND ABIDING CONCERNS
(2004). Obviously, without a constitution, the Supreme Court did not have the power of constitutional
review. Nor could it issue writs. Cheesman, supra note 73, at 97-98. Section 5(h) of the Judiciary Law
implied that the Court could examine administrative orders and decisions that infringe on individual rights,
but in practice it never attempted to exercise this power. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 62, at 452-53.
123
See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Situation of
Human Rights in Myanmar, supra note 119, at ¶ 35.
124
AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 122, at 18. The Supreme Court even went so far as to hold that judges
presiding over trials inside prison did not possess the authority to decide who could attend hearings. Joseph
Allchin, Burma Snatches Power from Judges, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA, Feb. 23, 2011,
http://www.dvb.no/news/burma-snatches-power-from-judges/14402.
125
TAYLOR, supra note 62, at 487.
126
FINK, supra note 97, at 74.
127
For example, the SLORC passed a law punishing criticism of the National Convention with up to
20 years’ imprisonment. The Law Protecting the Peaceful and Systematic Transfer of State Responsibility
and the Successful Performance of the Functions of the National Convention against Disturbances and
Oppositions, 1996, No. 5/1996, ch. II, § 3 (Myan.).
128
FINK, supra note 97, at 73-77.
129
Id. at 77.
130
Id. at 94.
131
The entire seven-step roadmap includes:
1) reconvening the National Convention; 2)
implementation of the process “for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system”; 3)
drafting a Constitution; 4) adopting the Constitution via a referendum; 5) holding legislative elections; 6)
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In September 2007, at the same time the government cracked down on the
Saffron Revolution, a protest led by Buddhist monks, the convention
released a draft of the “State Fundamental Principles.”132 In February 2008,
a fifty-four-member drafting commission produced the final draft
constitution based almost exactly on those principles.133
The SPDC scheduled a constitutional referendum for early May
134
2008.
However, on May 2-3, Cyclone Nargis hit the Irrawaddy Delta
region and killed approximately 140,000 Burmese.135 The SPDC postponed
the referendum in the cyclone-hit areas until May 24, while the rest of the
country voted as scheduled on May 10.136 According to government figures,
an astounding 98.12% of voters turned out and 92.48% voted in favor of the
new constitution.137 However, there were widespread charges of electoral
irregularities and vote rigging during the referendum.138 Many of the armed
ethnic insurgent groups rejected the constitution, claiming that it did not
provide sufficient autonomy for local governments. 139
The 2008
Constitution was thus adopted under inauspicious circumstances, a legacy
that would undermine its legitimacy even after the political transition.

convening the legislature; and 7) forming the government and other constitutional bodies. TAYLOR, supra
note 62, at 491–92.
132
The Fundamental Principles and Detailed Basic Principles, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Sept. 10,
2007.
133
Commission Approves Draft of the State Constitution, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Feb. 20, 2008,
at 16. While the drafting process nominally took over fifteen years, as with much else in Myanmar, what
actually happened remains obscure. According to some sources, Dr. Maung Maung—constitutional law
scholar, alleged drafter of the 1974 Constitution, and former chief justice, attorney-general and president—
drafted much of the current constitution before his death in 1994. INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA REPORT NO. 174,
MYAN.: TOWARDS THE ELECTIONS 8 (2009). Indeed, by the mid-1990s, many of the basic principles of the
constitution had already been drafted. The New Light of Myanmar published excerpts of proceedings when
the National Convention was in session. For relevant examples, see generally BURMA PRESS SUMMARY VOLS.
VII(1)-X(4) (Jan. 1993-Apr. 1996), available at http://www.burmalibrary.org/show.php?cat=1455&
lo=d&sl=0.
134
Approval of the Constitution Draft will be Sought in a National Referendum to be Held in May
2008, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Feb. 11, 2008.
135
TRIPARTITE CORE GROUP, POST-NARGIS PERIODIC REVIEW III ix (2010).
136
VORAVIT SUWANVANICHKIJ ET AL., AFTER THE STORM: VOICES FROM THE DELTA 54 (2009).
137
Id. at 66.
138
STEINBERG, supra note 95, at 144-45. See generally PUBLIC INT’L L. & POL’Y GRP., BURMA’S
CONSTITUTIONAL
REFERENDUM:
NEITHER
FREE
NOR
FAIR
(2008),
available
at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/PILPG_Report_Burmese_Constitutional_Referendum_Neither_Free_N
or_Fair-11_May_2008.pdf.
139
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 5.
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The 2008 Constitution

The 2008 Constitution revived some of the democratic structures of
the 1947 Constitution, but with notable differences. The Pyihtaungsu
Hluttaw (Union Legislature) contains two houses, the Pyithu (People’s
chamber) with 440 members and the Amyotha (Nationalities chamber) with
224 members.140 All members have five-year terms, coterminous with those
of the president. 141 However, the commander-in-chief of the Myanmar
Defense Services has the authority to appoint a quarter of all Hluttaw
members.142 Legislative schedules divide jurisdiction between the Union
and state or region hluttaws.143 The Pyihtaungsu Hluttaw retains authority
over defense, security, foreign affairs, and judicial administration, as well as
the centralized budget, while each state/region controls local finance and
projects.144
In the executive branch, the president is selected by an electoral
college composed of members of the Pyithu Hluttaw, the Amyotha Hluttaw,
and all tatmadaw MPs. Each group chooses a candidate, one of whom is
elected by the entire Hluttaw as president, with the other two as vicepresidents.145 The President appoints not only Union ministers, but also the
state/region chief ministers, cabinet ministers, and advocates-general.146 The
Constitution instructs the Hluttaw to give deference to the President’s
nominees unless they do not meet the professional criteria listed in the
Constitution.147 The President also serves as chairperson of the National
Defense and Security Council (“NDSC”), which has the authority to declare
a state of emergency.148 However, the President does not control all the
levers of power, and does not even have the ability to veto legislation.149
The 2008 Constitution largely confirms the previous institutional
structure of the judiciary, with a few exceptions. As before, the Supreme
Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over the High Courts for each
state/region, as well as subordinate District and Township Courts.150 The
text of the Constitution appears vague and contradictory with regard to
140

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, May 29, 2008, ch. IV, §§ 109,
141 (Myan.) [hereinafter MYAN. CONST. (2008)].
141
Id. at § 119.
142
Id. at §§ 109(b) and 141(b).
143
Id. at Schedules I, II. There are seven states and seven regions. Id. at ch. II, § 49.
144
Id. at Schedules I, II.
145
Id. at ch. III, § 60.
146
Id. at ch. V, § 232.
147
See, e.g., id. at ch. VI, § 323(d).
148
Id. at ch. XI, § 410.
149
Id. at ch. IV, §§ 105-06.
150
Id. at ch. VI, §§ 314-16.

652

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 23 NO. 3

judicial independence.
Section 11 states that the judiciary should
“administer justice independently according to law.” 151 However, in
explaining the separation of powers, it states that the judiciary is separate “to
the extent possible.”152 The low impeachment threshold could also pose a
threat to judicial independence. A quarter of Hluttaw members from either
chamber can initiate impeachment proceedings, 153 giving the military
sufficient votes to impeach any judge. The grounds for impeachment
include potentially subjective terms such as “inefficient discharge of duties”
and “breach of the constitution.”154
Aside from the formal branches of government, Chapter VII of the
Constitution grants considerable powers to the military (tatmadaw). While
the president appoints the commander-in-chief, his choice is subject to
NDSC approval. 155 Once ensconced, the commander-in-chief is secure
because the Constitution does not stipulate any limits on his term in office or
provisions for his removal. 156 Moreover, the Constitution allows the
Defense Services to “independently administer and adjudicate” all matters
pertaining to the armed forces,157 which critics allege potentially removes
legislative or judicial oversight.158
Finally, Chapter VIII of the Constitution lists fundamental rights and
duties, most of which are civil and political rights. Significantly, it
reintroduces habeas corpus for the first time in two generations.159 Between
March 31, 2011 and June 30, 2013, the Supreme Court received 432
petitions for writs, of which 286 were rejected, and of which 84 were
pending.160 However, many fundamental rights are subject to extensive
restrictions, such as “security, prevalence of law and order, community peace
and tranquility or public order and morality,”161 which could undermine the
underlying right. The constitution also includes social and economic rights,
such as education and health,162 but it is unclear if these are justiciable.163
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

109.

160

Id. at ch. I, § 19(a).
Id. at § 11(a).
Id. at ch. III, § 71(b) - VI, § 302(c).
Id. at ch. VI, § 302(a).
Id. at ch. VII, § 342.
See id.
Id. at ch. I, § 20(b).
GHAI, supra note 5, at 27.
MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. VI, § 296 (Myan.); see also Cheesman, supra note 73, at

Chief Justice of the Union Stresses Important Role of Courts in Ensuring Rule of Law, THE NEW
LIGHT OF MYAN., Aug. 9, 2013, at 8.
161
MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 159, at ch. VIII, § 354.
162
Id. at §§ 366(a) & 367.
163
Economic and social rights in constitutions have often been held to be non-justiciable. MARK V.
TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN
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Critics have frequently condemned the process for amending the
Constitution.164 Under Chapter XII, constitutional amendments require the
support of seventy-five percent of each chamber, 165 which affords the
tatmadaw bloc an effective veto.166 For some provisions, including many of
the basic principles, a referendum is required.167 Critics have attacked this as
the military’s attempt to straightjacket future democratic governments.168
While there are currently attempts to amend the Constitution (discussed
below), the high barrier to amendment has indeed made political
reconciliation more difficult as certain provisions of the Constitution have
become major sources of contention.
F.

Transition to Democracy? (2010 and Onward)

On November 7, 2010, the government held elections for the new
Pyihtaungsu Hluttaw and the state/regional legislatures. 169 The NLD
boycotted the elections entirely because Aung San Suu Kyi was still under
house arrest and party leaders believed the elections would be neither free
nor fair.170 In addition to restrictions on campaigning, many opposition
groups alleged that the government-backed Union Solidarity and
Development Party (“USDP”) relied on suspicious “advance votes” to tip
the balance in its favor.171 Other observers reported widespread vote buying
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241 (2007). Recently, however, some constitutional courts have
begun to interpret such rights as enforceable. The South African Constitutional Court has led the way in
developing a jurisprudential approach based on the reasonableness of the government’s implementation of
economic and social rights. See, e.g,, Cass Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South
Africa, (Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 12, 2001), available at
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1276&context=public_law_and_legal_the
ory; Cass Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa, 11 CONST. FORUM 123 (20002001). However, nothing in Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution indicates that these rights are enforceable. See
MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 159, at ch. VIII. In fact, the Constitution provides such rights “in accord
with [educational or health] policy,” Id. at §§ 366 and 367, giving the legislature considerable discretion.
164
Williams, supra note 5, at 1669; GHAI, supra note 5, at 36; see also Htet Aung, An Alternative
Solution to Amend the Constitution, THE IRRAWADDY, May 14, 2010, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.
php?art_id=17916.
165
MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 159, at ch. XII, §§ 433–36.
166
Kay Latt, Opposition-Backed Constitutional Amendments will be Difficult, THE IRRAWADDY, Sept.
14, 2009, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16775&page=1.
167
MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 159, at ch. XII, § 436(a).
168
See Dominic J. Nardi, Jr., Burma’s Constitution: Straightjacket or Red Herring?, NEW MANDALA
BLOG, Feb. 29, 2012, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2012/02/29/burma’s-constitutionstraightjacket-or-red-herring/.
169
STEINBERG, supra note 95, at 188-92.
170
Id. at 190-91; see generally INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA BRIEFING NO. 118: MYANMAR’S POSTELECTION LANDSCAPE (2011).
171
See, e.g., Htet Aung, Those Shadowy Advance Votes, THE IRRAWADDY, Dec., 2010,
http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20383.
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and intimidation.172 In the end, the USDP won around seventy-eight percent
of all contested seats.173 The Hluttaw elected former general and prime
minister Thein Sein as president and former general Thura Shwe Mann as
speaker of the legislature.174
To the surprise of many observers, Myanmar’s elites did not simply
trade in their military uniforms for business suits, but rather took genuine yet
gradual steps towards reform.175 President Thein Sein relaxed censorship,
pursued currency reform, released hundreds of political prisoners, and
suspended construction of the unpopular Myitsoe Dam in Kachin State.176
The government has also negotiated ceasefire agreements with many of the
remaining ethnic insurgent groups, including the Karen National Union,
putting an end to the fifty-year civil war.177 Under Speaker Shwe Mann’s
leadership, the Hluttaw has become much more than a rubber-stamp for the
military’s agenda. 178 The legislature has passed dozens of new laws,
including legislation legalizing trade unions and permitting public
protests. 179 Shwe Mann has even formed oversight committees and
encouraged opposition MPs to propose bills.180 For its part, the military has
largely refrained from dominating policy debates. 181 The military MPs
seldom vote as a unified bloc and often vote against the USDP.182
In August 2011, President Thein Sein reached a détente with Aung
San Suu Kyi, who had been released shortly after the elections.183 She
announced that she believed the president’s commitment to reform and
172

Jack Davies & Haroon Siddique, Burma Election Observers Report Voter Intimidation, THE
GUARDIAN, Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/08/burma-election-voterintimidation.
173
Figures of Multiparty Democracy General Elections for Respective Hluttaws Announced, NEW
LIGHT OF MYAN., Dec. 8, 2010, http://www.burmanet.org/news/2010/12/08/new-light-of-myanmar-figuresof-multiparty-democracy-general-elections-for-respective-hluttaws-announced/.
174
Meeting of Group of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Representatives-Elect of Presidential Electoral College
held U Thein Sein Elected as President, Thiha Thura U Tin Aung Myint Oo, Dr. Sai Mauk Kham (a)
Maung Ohn as Vice-Presidents, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Feb. 5, 2011, at 1.
175
INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA BRIEFING NO. 127: MYANMAR: MAJOR REFORM UNDERWAY (2011); INT’L
CRISIS GRP., ASIA REPORT NO. 214: MYANMAR: A NEW PEACE INITIATIVE (2011); INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA
BRIEFING NO. 136: REFORM IN MYANMAR: ONE YEAR ON (2012).
176
Dominic J. Nardi, Jr., Discipline-Flourishing Constitutional Review: A Legal and Political
Analysis of Myanmar's New Constitutional Tribunal, 12 AUSTL. J. OF ASIAN L. 1 (2011).
177
Burma Government Signs Ceasefire With Karen Rebels, BBC NEWS, Jan. 12, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16523691.
178
See generally INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA BRIEFING NO. 142: NOT A RUBBER STAMP: MYANMAR’S
LEGIS. IN A TIME OF TRANSITION (2013).
179
Id. at 9-13.
180
Id. at 6.
181
Id. at 6-8.
182
Id.
183
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dissident Meets Leader of Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/world/asia/20myanmar.html?_r=0.
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agreed to participate in the political process.184 On April 1, the NLD ran
candidates in forty-four by-elections and won forty-three seats, compared to
the USDP’s single victory.185 Aung San Suu Kyi became chairperson for the
Pyithu Hluttaw Committee for Rule of Law, Peace, and Tranquility, which
has jurisdiction over general questions of the rule of law and judicial
reform.186 While the NLD has been critical of some aspects of government
policy, as of 2014 it appears committed to working through the legislature.187
In early 2013, the legislature established a 109-member Constitutional
Review Joint Committee to study proposed amendments, with fifty-two
members from the USDP, twenty-five from the military, and seven from the
NLD (all eighteen political parties in the legislature have at least one MP).188
The Committee received over 300,000 suggestions from political parties,
NGOs, legal experts, and government officials.189 Most of the suggestions
have focused on the Constitution’s basic principles and the process for
amending the Constitution.190 For its part, the NLD has demanded that the
ban on presidential candidates with foreign dependents 191 be removed,
especially because Daw Suu’s children are British citizens and she has
announced her intention to compete for the presidency in 2015.192 It has also
proposed eliminating the military’s role in the legislature.193 Further, the
USDP has proposed making district and township administrators directly
elected and chief ministers appointed by each state/regional legislature rather
184

Larry Jagan, What Thein Sein Promised Suu Kyi, ASIA TIMES, Sept. 30, 2011,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MI30Ae01.html.
185
Dean Nelson, Burma Elections: President Thein Sein Happy with Result, THE TELEGRAPH, Apr. 3,
2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/9183220/Burma-electionsPresident-Thein-Sein-happy-with-result.html.
186
Min Lwin, Suu Kyi to Head ‘Rule of Law’ Committee, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA, Aug. 8,
2012, http://www.dvb.no/news/suu-kyi-to-head-‘rule-of-law’-committee/23217.
187
See, e.g., Simon Roughneen, NLD to Probe Thein Sein’s USDP Role, THE IRRAWADDY, Oct. 19,
2012, http://www.irrawaddy.org/nld/nld-to-probe-thein-seins-usdp-role.html.
188
Soe Than Lin & Min Min, Suu Kyi Cautions Constitution Review Joint Committee, MIZZIMA
NEWS, Nov. 19, 2013, http://mizzima.com/mizzima-news/politics/item/10607-suu-kyi-cautions-constitution
-review-joint-committee.
189
Soe Than Linn & Nyan Hlaing Linn, Constitution Review Panel to Meet Deadline, Say MPs,
MIZZIMA NEWS, Jan. 17, 2014, http://mizzima.com/mizzima-news/politics/item/10864-constitution-reviewpanel-to-meet-deadline-say-mps.
190
Ei Ei Toe Lwin, Constitution Committee will not Vote on Suggestions, THE MYAN. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2014, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/9271-constitution-committee-will-not-vote-onsuggestions.html.
191
MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. III, § 59(f ) (Myan.).
192
Hilary Whiteman, Myanmar's Suu Kyi: 'I Want to Run for President', CNN, June 6, 2013, http://
www.cnn.com/2013/06/06/world/asia/myanmar-suu-kyi-presidential-aspiration/.
193
Shwe Aung, 150 Constitutional Clauses Should be Amended, Says NLD, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF
BURMA, Dec. 27, 2013, http://www.dvb.no/news/150-constitutional-clauses-should-be-amended-says-nldburma-myanmar/35593.
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than by the president, partly as an attempt to satisfy ethnic minority
parties.194
As of January 31, 2014, the Committee report proposed more limited
changes, but its report is not binding upon the rest of the legislature.195
Indeed, Speaker Shwe Mann released a statement calling upon the
legislature to consider reforming the military’s role to conform to democratic
principles.196
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL & JURISPRUDENCE

The 2008 Constitution reintroduced the concept of constitutional
review, but vested that power in a new Constitutional Tribunal rather than a
Supreme Court.197 This section provides an overview of the Constitutional
Tribunal’s structure and powers.
It then analyzes the Tribunal’s
jurisprudential reasoning in all five of the decisions it issued. In
adjudicating a dispute between the president and legislature, the Tribunal
announced that legislative committees did not have constitutional status.
This section concludes by discussing the ensuing backlash and impeachment
of the Tribunal members.
A.

Constitutional Tribunal Structure & Powers

The Constitutional Tribunal has authority to “vet” legislation and
executive orders for conformity with the Constitution. 198 It can also
adjudicate disputes between various government actors.199 The Constitution
does not prescribe a standard of review or method of constitutional
interpretation. However, it does clearly state that “[t]he resolution of the
Constitutional Tribunal of the Union shall be final and conclusive,” meaning
that any laws the Tribunal finds unconstitutional should immediately
become null and void without the need for further action from the
legislature.200
194

Htet Naing Zaw, USDP Announces Surprise Constitutional Amendment Proposal, THE
IRRAWADDY, Dec. 31, 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/usdp-announces-surprise-constitutionalamendment-proposal.html.
195
Lawi Weng, Burma Parliament Committee: Keep Main Points of Constitution, THE IRRAWADDY,
Jan.
31,
2014,
http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/burma-parliament-committee-keep-main-pointsconstitution.html.
196
Office of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, The Basic Principles For the Implementation Committee, 2014, at
§ B(2) (Myan.) (Thura Shwe Mann, Speaker).
197
MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. VI, § 322(b)-(c) (Myan.).
198
Id.
199
Id. at § 322(d)-(e).
200
Id. at § 324; see also Constitutional Tribunal Law, 2010, No. 21, ch. VI (Myan.) (The State Peace
and Development Council Law). In describing the Constitutional Tribunal’s powers, the English-language
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The Constitutional Tribunal is composed of nine members, including a
chairperson, each appointed for five-year terms. 201 The president and
speakers of both chambers of the Pyithu Hluttaw and Amyotha Hluttaw each
choose three justices, subject to confirmation by the entire legislature.202
Tribunal nominees must be at least fifty years old, and must have served for
at least five years as a judge on the High Court; ten years as a judicial
officer; twenty years as an advocate; or an eminent jurist “in the opinion of
the President.”203 This last criterion affords the president relatively broad
discretion in selecting nominees because there is no definition of “eminent
jurist.”204 In addition, members must be “loyal to the Union” and have a
“political, administrative, economic, and security outlook.”205 This provision
is not immediately clear, but appears designed to allow the government to
evaluate a candidate’s political ideology and career experience.
Direct standing before the Tribunal is limited to several senior
government officials, including the president, speakers of each Pyihtaungsu
Hluttaw chamber, and chief justice of the Supreme Court.206 In addition,
state/regional chief ministers and legislative speakers, as well as ten percent
of the Hluttaw, can submit questions in accord with “certain procedures.”207
Non-governmental actors do not have standing to petition the Tribunal
directly. 208 It seems possible for citizens to use § 323 to get a case
containing constitutional questions referred by the ordinary courts to the
Tribunal chief justice, 209 but this has not yet occurred. However, because
judges possess discretion in making such referrals, there is a risk that they
would deny petitions by claiming that the dispute can be resolved without
answering any constitutional questions. The 2010 Constitutional Tribunal
Law appears to grant the Constitutional Tribunal Chief Justice significant
version of the “State Fundamental Principles” uses the term “scrutinize,” whereas the final draft uses “vet.”
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the former merely means to examine closely, while the latter
means to check a subject’s authority or suitability—implying considerably stronger powers. Compare
Scrutinize, v., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/173774?redirected
From=scrutinize (last visited May 24, 2014), with Vet, v., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/222953?rskey=NhhEZC&result=3&isAdvanced=false (last visited May
24, 2014). The Burmese-language versions both use the same word—sie zit—so the English change does
not affect the legal meaning, but possibly demonstrates the drafters’ desire to enhance the tribunal’s authority,
at least for English-language audiences. The two versions are otherwise identical with respect to the tribunal.
201
MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 197, at ch. VI, § 335.
202
Id. at § 321.
203
Id. at § 333.
204
See id. at § 333(d)(iv).
205
Id. at § 333(h)-(g).
206
Id. at § 325.
207
Id. at § 326.
208
See id. at §§ 325, 326.
209
Id. at § 323.
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agenda-setting powers in such cases because it instructs him to submit his
opinion on such cases to the other members.210
As with the ordinary judiciary, the impeachment threshold is relatively
low. Either the president or a quarter of either Hluttaw chamber can initiate
impeachment proceedings against Tribunal members for “high treason,”
“misconduct” or even “inefficient discharge of duties.”211 There is also some
ambiguity as to whether or not the Constitution’s guarantee of judicial
independence extends to the Tribunal. Like the President and legislators but
unlike judges, the Tribunal members serve for only five-year terms.212 The
Constitution uses the Burmese word khone yone (specialized court) to
describe the Tribunal, rather than taya hluttaw (court of justice), the term
used for the ordinary courts. The Constitution also does not list the Tribunal
amongst institutions sharing “judicial power.”213 In earlier drafts of the
Constitution, the provisions for the Tribunal were even separated from those
for the rest of the judiciary, although by 2008 they were moved to the
chapter on the judiciary (Chapter VI).214
As noted above, knowledge about the actual process of drafting the
2008 Constitution remains limited. It is not clear why the military elite
acceded to the inclusion of a constitutional court, or indeed if they even
understood the risks of constitutional review.215 Official proceedings from
the National Convention tend to be either unenlightening or restate the
obvious. U Tin Sein of Pyay Township in Bago Division, representative of
“workers,” explained that “[the Constitutional Tribunal] is a must for
210

Constitutional Tribunal Law, 2010, No. 21, ch. VI, § 17 (Myan.) (The State Peace and
Development Council Law).
211
MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. VI, § 334 (Myan.).
212
Id. at § 335.
213
The Basic Principles of the 2008 Constitution state: “The judicial power of the Union is shared
among the Supreme Court of the Union, High Courts of the Regions, High Courts of the States and courts
of different levels, including Courts of Self-Administered Areas.” See id. at ch. I, § 18(a).
214
In the “State Fundamental Principles,” provisions on the Constitutional Tribunal fell under the
chapter on General Provisions (Chapter XV). Only in late 2007 did the National Convention’s Constitution
Drafting Commission move the provisions on the Tribunal to the same chapter as the judiciary (Chapter
VI). It remains unclear why the Commission did this, although even in the final draft the provisions for the
Tribunal are separated by a different heading. Compare The Fundamental Principles and Detailed Basic
Principles, supra note 132, with MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 211, at ch. VI.
215
While the author has heard several interesting rumors while in Yangon, these generally lack
concrete evidence. One rumor is that the lawyers drafting the 2008 Constitution separated the
Constitutional Tribunal from the Supreme Court in order to create more patronage opportunities for the
legal profession. Proponents point out that the Constitution requires judges and certain other officeholders
to possess law degrees. Interview with Anonymous, in Yangon, Myanmar (June 3, 2010). However, this
seems dubious on several counts. First, the professional criteria are similar to and most likely copied from
the 1947 Constitution. Second, if the Constitutional Tribunal had been primarily designed for patronage,
then life tenure (or at least lengthy terms) would have been more appropriate. The current five-year term
provides little job security. Finally, the drafters could have pursued similar (if not better) patronage
opportunities by expanding the membership of the Supreme Court.
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ensuring perpetual existence of the State Constitution.”216 This suggests that
he, and in turn other drafters, considered a constitutional court important for
the success of the Constitution itself, perhaps referencing the widely held
belief that constitutional review makes constitutions more responsive to
change.217 Unfortunately, U Tin Sein does not elaborate on his comment.
Other comments at the National Convention stressed the disputeresolution function of the Constitutional Tribunal. U Sein Kyi, a convention
representative on behalf of “intellectuals and intelligentsia,” predicted the
Tribunal would handle political disputes about the meaning of the
Constitution, which he claims justifies the requirement that Tribunal
members possess a background in political, administrative, and security
affairs. 218 Along these lines, he argues that allowing senior government
officials to submit abstract questions to the Tribunal is “appropriate because
they are the heads of respective organizations.”219
Such statements indicate that the drafters viewed the Tribunal as a
forum in which to resolve intra-governmental disputes, not as a means for
citizens to check the government. It is notable that none of the delegates
justified the Tribunal as necessary to protect fundamental rights. It seems
particularly likely that the drafters viewed the Tribunal as a means through
which to police jurisdictional boundaries in the new government, especially
between the Union government and the new state/regional governments.220
The Constitution contains legislative schedules delineating Union and
state/regional jurisdiction, but several provisions remain ambiguous.221
On February 5, 2011, the Hluttaw confirmed the nine Constitutional
Tribunal members.222 The three members nominated by the president were U
Thein Soe, Dr Tin Aung Aye, and Daw Khin Hla Myint.223 The three
chosen by the Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw were U Tun Kyi, U Soe
216

Delegate Group of Intellectuals and Intelligentsia at the Plenary Session of the National
Convention Held at Pyidaungsu Hall, Nyaunghnapin Camp, Hmawby Township, Yangon Division (28
December 2006), THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Jan. 1, 2007, at 10.
217
See ELKINS, supra note 13, at 106-09.
218
Delegate Group of Intellectuals and Intelligentsia at the Plenary Session of the National
Convention held at Pyidaungsu Hall, Nyaunghnapin Camp, Hmawby Township, Yangon Division (28
December 2006), supra note 216.
219
Id.
220
Nardi, supra note 176, at 24; see generally JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION:
PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 119-25 (2008) (explaining how courts help police boundaries of federal
jurisdictions).
221
For example, state and regional governments have jurisdiction over “small business loans,” but the
threshold for a loan to be considered small is not defined in the Constitution. See MYAN. CONST. (2008),
May 29, 2008, Schedules II(1)(k), (Myan.).
222
Fourth-day Regular Session of First Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Held, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Feb.
12, 2011, at 9, 16.
223
Id.
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Thein, and U Khin Tun.224 Finally, the three nominated by the Speaker of the
Amyotha Hluttaw were U Hsan Myint, U Myint Kyaing, and Daw Mi Mi Yi.
All nine were confirmed with no objections.225 Thein Soe had been the
chairperson of the Elections Commission during the November 2010
elections and was appointed to head the Tribunal. 226
B.

Constitutional Tribunal Jurisprudence

The next five sections (Sections IV.B.1-5) analyze the jurisprudential
reasoning in each of the five cases the Constitutional Tribunal heard between
March 2011 and August 2012. The Tribunal members primarily used
textualist or originalist approaches to interpreting the Constitution.
However, after the backlash from a controversial decision regarding the
status of legislative committees, the Tribunal seemed to adopt a balancing
test in its final decision.
1.

Chief Justice v. Ministry of Home Affairs

The Constitutional Tribunal’s first case, Chief Justice v. Ministry of
Home Affairs, focused on the extent of the 2008 Constitution’s guarantee of
judicial independence in § 11.227 The Ministry of Home Affairs (“MHA”)
attempted to confer first class judicial power 228 on twenty-seven subtownship administrative officials, allowing them to try criminal cases.229 The
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court claimed that creating judgeships based in

224

Id.
Id.
226
Soe Than Lynn & Shwe Yinn Mar Oo, Members of Constitutional Tribunal Nominated, List of
Ministers Approved, THE MYAN. TIMES, Feb. 14-20, 2011, http://www.mmtimes.com/2011/
news/562/news56203.html. The other members’ backgrounds are:
Tin Aung Aye (Former Economic Institute Director);
Khin Hla Myint (Supreme Court Crime Department Director);
Tun Kyi (Retired Supreme Court Director);
Soe Thein (Retired Supreme Court Director);
Khin Tun (Retired Supreme Court Director);
Hsan Myint (Revenue Appeals Court Director);
Myint Kyaing (Region law officer and Director); and
Mi Mi Yi (Retired Supreme Court Deputy Director).
227
The Chief Justice of the Union v. Ministry of Home Affairs, [2011] No. 1/2011 (C.T.) 23 (Myan.)
[hereinafter Chief Justice v. MHA].
228
Courts of Magistrates with first class judicial power can only impose the following sentences:
“imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, including such solitary confinement as is authorized by
law; Fine not exceeding one thousand rupees; Whipping.” Higher sentences can only be imposed by higher
classes of Magistrates. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, ch. III, § 32(a) (Myan.).
229
Chief Justice v. MHA, supra note 227, at 23-24.
225
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the executive branch would infringe upon the judiciary’s constitutionally
protected independence.230
The MHA based its argument largely on historical precedents. It
noted that even under the 1947 Constitution, the government used
administrative officials to adjudicate local criminal cases.231 After the 1988
coup, the SLORC/SPDC revived this practice with the 1988 Judiciary
Law.232 Given how much the 2008 Constitution borrowed from the 1947
Constitution, and the fact that the 2008 Constitution was drafted by the
SPDC, the MHA actually had a fairly compelling historical argument to
support its position. The MHA asked the Tribunal to interpret the text of the
2008 Constitution in light of undisputed historical practices in Myanmar.
Given the language of § 11(a)—that the judicial power should be “separated,
to the extent possible” 233—the Tribunal probably could have found sufficient
textual ambiguity to justify following historical precedent.234
Instead, the Tribunal ruled that the MHA’s decision was
unconstitutional and stated unequivocally that § 11(a) should be read as a
firm guarantee of judicial independence, despite the ambiguity.235 It argued
that § 11(a) could not be read in isolation, but rather in context with § 18(a)
and Chapter VI, which describe the judicial power and only vest it in the
judiciary. 236 It noted that nowhere does the Constitution authorize
administrative officers to perform judicial functions. 237 It also explicitly
rejected the use of historical arguments. It stated that the situation under the
SPDC was “not the same” because the 2008 Constitution had not yet gone
into effect. 238 Therefore, the Tribunal found the MHA administrative
adjudicators unconstitutional.239
The Constitutional Tribunal clearly took a textualist approach despite
clear historical precedent against doing so.
The decision did not
unequivocally reject historical precedent, but rather stated that it would only

230

Id. at 24-25.
Id., at 28-29.
232
See State Law and Order Restoration Council Law (Judiciary Law), 1988, No. 2/1988, ch. VI, §
11 (Myan.).
233
MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. I, § 11 (Myan.).
234
For example, the U.S. permits the use of administrative law judges, despite no clear evidence in
Article III of the Constitution supporting their use. See U.S. CONST. art. III; see also STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMININISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, AND A CROSS-NATIONAL
THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION (1990).
235
Chief Justice v. MHA, [2011] No. 1/2011 (C.T.) 23 (Myan.).
236
Id. at 33.
237
Id. at 33-34.
238
Id. at 33.
239
Id. at 36.
231
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consider precedent arising out of the 2008 Constitution.240 In other words,
the Tribunal would not use historical practices or law under previous
constitutions in order to interpret the 2008 Constitution. 241 Indeed, as
discussed below, the Tribunal’s next few cases made extensive use of
National Convention proceedings to interpret the Constitution.
2.

Dr. Aye Maung v. Myanmar

In Dr. Aye Maung, et. al. v. Myanmar, a group of Amyotha Hluttaw
MPs filed a petition to invalidate a portion of the 2011 Law of Emoluments,
Allowances, and Insignia of Office for Representatives of the Region or
State.242 In particular, they argued that §§ 5 and 17 excluded state/region
level Ministers for National Races Affairs from certain benefits that other
ministers enjoyed.243 They argued that the Constitution does not distinguish
between types of ministers and that all ministers should be treated equally.244
The Union Attorney-General argued that § 262(a)(iv) of the 2008
Constitution authorized the appointment of an official from the state/regional
hluttaw to oversee race or ethnic affairs and described the process of
appointment, but did not explicitly confer ministerial status.245 He also noted
that the Ministers of National Races Affairs performed different duties from
other ministers and therefore could not claim the same rights.246
The Constitutional Tribunal found that the National Races Affairs
Ministers did in fact qualify as ministers under the law.247 It noted that §
262(f) of the Constitution allows the president to appoint the persons
selected by the state/regional Chief Minister “as Ministers” and does not
differentiate those appointments from those selected under § 262(a)(iv).248
In addition, the Tribunal referenced the 2010 Union Government Law and
the Region or State Government Law in order to interpret the Constitution.249
The Region or State Government Law explicitly uses the term “ministers” to
240

See id. at 33.
See id.
242
Dr. Aye Maung, et al., v. The Rep. of the Union of Myan., [2011] No. 2/2011 (C.T.) 6 (Myan.)
[hereinafter Dr. Aye Maung v. Myan.].
243
Under § 5 of the law, the National Races Affairs Ministers would have received an allowance of
MMK 1,000,000 (10 lakhs) monthly as opposed to MMK 2,000,000 (20 lakhs) enjoyed by other ministers.
See Law of Emoluments, Allowances and Insignia of Office for Representatives of the Region or State,
2011, No. 3/2011, §§ 4-5 (Myan.). In addition, they would have received fewer non-pecuniary benefits
than other ministers. See id. at §§ 16-17.
244
Dr. Aye Maung v. Myan., supra note 242, at 64-65.
245
Id. at 66.
246
Id. at 67.
247
Id. at 81.
248
Id. at 72-74.
249
Id. at 74-75.
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describe the officials who manage national races affairs. 250 The Union
Government Law provides a list of state/regional officials whom the
President can appoint, including state/regional “ministers” but not other
executive agency officials.251 Therefore, the members struck down §§ 5 and
17 of the Law of Emoluments as unconstitutional.252
As in Chief Justice v. MHA, the Constitutional Tribunal’s reasoning
was still primarily textualist, in that it focused on the text of the Constitution
and how the different parts of § 262 fit together. The Attorney-General did
attempt to analogize the case to principles of private employment law, when
he noted that the National Races Affairs Ministers did not have the same
duties as other ministers and therefore are not entitled to the same rights.253
The Tribunal rejected this by explaining that private law was not informative
with regard to public employment.254
Unlike the previous case, the Constitutional Tribunal did consider
original intent. The Tribunal cited a description of the basic principles from
the National Convention Plenary Session, stating in effect that state/region
ministers have the same status of Union deputy ministers.255 However, this
part of the decision is likely dicta, as the quote only talks about ministers
generally, not the National Races Affairs Ministers in particular. 256
Textualist arguments still dominated the Tribunal’s reasoning. The Tribunal
curtly dismissed the Attorney-General’s contention that there had never been
any intention to make the National Races Affairs Ministers full state/regional
ministers because the basic principles of the constitution take precedence.257
3.

President v. Dr. Aye Maung

In early 2012, President Thein Sein submitted a petition requesting
that the Constitutional Tribunal overturn its decision in Dr. Aye Maung v.
Myanmar.258 In President v. Dr. Aye Maung, the Constitutional Tribunal
reaffirmed its earlier decision, noting that § 324 of the 2008 Constitution
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The Region or State Government Law, 2010, No. 16 /2010, § 10(a)(ii) (Myan.).
See The Union Government Law, 2010, No. 15/2010, § 19(c) (Myan.).
252
Dr. Aye Maung v. Myan., [2011] No. 2/2011 (C.T.) 81 (Myan.).
253
Id. at 80.
254
Id. at 80.
255
Id. at 77.
256
See id.
257
Id. at 75-76. This case has also been described as a proxy fight between the legislature and the
president by those knowledgeable. Interview with Anonymous, in Yangon, Myanmar (Dec. 31, 2011).
258
State Constitutional Tribunal Hears Attorney-General’s Query, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN. 9, Feb.
25, 2012, at 9.
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states all Tribunal decisions are “final and conclusive.”259 The decision itself
is relatively brief and did not change the legal basis for Dr. Aye Maung v.
Myanmar. However, in rejecting the president’s petition, it does provide two
additional examples of the Constitutional Tribunal’s attitude towards
historical and legal analogies.
First, the Attorney-General argued that the Constitutional Tribunal
should follow the interpretation in the 1961 Supreme Court decision, Bo
Sein Toe v. Sein Toe,260 which found that the phrase “shall be final and
conclusive” in the Parliament Selection Act did not prohibit the Court from
reversing itself when it had made an error in law.261 The Tribunal rejected
this argument because the Constitutional Tribunal’s authority is different
from that of the Supreme Court and its powers are not binding on the
Tribunal. 262 Again, the Tribunal’s rejection of historical evidence was
premised on its lack of relevance to the question at hand.
Second, the Attorney-General attempted to argue that the Myanmar
Code of Civil Procedure should govern in the absence of a specific rule
about reversing decisions in the Constitutional Tribunal Law.263 The Tribunal
agreed that § 21 of the Constitutional Tribunal Law did incorporate the Code
of Civil Procedure, but only with regard to hearings, not decisions. 264
Relying upon a definition from Black’s Law Dictionary, the Tribunal stated
that “hearings” were for the purpose of obtaining evidence and reaching a
decision, but did not extend to a decision already issued.265 Interestingly, the
Tribunal also cited a 1986 case, Sein Hlaing v. Maung Maung Aye,266 to
elaborate upon the definition of “hearing.” Its willingness to cite this case
suggests that the Tribunal would accept historical analogies in order to
interpret general legal terms, but not to interpret the 2008 Constitution.

259

President of the Union v. Dr. Aye Maung, et al., [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 1 (Myan.) [hereinafter
President v. Dr. Aye Maung].
260
Id. at 2.
261
Id. at 2-3.
262
Id. at 3; see also MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. VI, § 294 (Myan.).
263
President v. Dr. Aye Maung, supra note 259, at 3.
264
Id. at 4.
265
Id.
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Id.
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President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw

The Constitutional Tribunal’s third case, President v. Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw, 267 engendered the most controversy and led directly to the
impeachment crisis (discussed infra in Part IV.C). The precise political
interests underlying the dispute are unclear. The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and its
defenders argued that “union level organization” status allowed legislative
committees to oversee the executive branch and to subpoena government
ministers.268 However, President Thein Sein allegedly grew concerned that
Hluttaw committees were using their powers to delay the passage of critical
legislation, including the Foreign Investment Law, which was subject to over
94 amendments and was debated for months.269 Thus, in early 2012, the
president asked if Pyidaungsu Hluttaw legislative committees fell under the
category of “union level organizations” under the 2008 Constitution.270
As a matter of law, the 2008 Constitution itself does not provide an
explicit definition of “union level organization,” although it does use the
term several times.271 The Attorney-General argued that the Constitution
mentions the possibility of inviting “union level organizations” to submit
proposals to the legislature, implying that these were external bodies.272
Although the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw itself and each of its chambers are “union
level organizations,” it cannot be imputed that its representatives are as
267

President of the Union v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw et. al., [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 4 (Myan), reprinted
in Verdict Handed Down on Submission No. 1/2012 Submitted by Attorney-General of the Union on Behalf
of the President of the Union, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Aug. 16, 2012, at 4 [hereinafter President v.
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw].
268
Union Level Crossword Still Unresolved, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Sept. 6, 2012, at 16.
269
Id.
270
Gregory B. Poling & Kathleen Bissonnette, Myanmar’s Crisis Calls for Constitutional
Overhauling, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., Sept. 14, 2012, http://csis.org/publication/myanmarscrisis-calls-constitutional-overhauling. Other commentators point to possible financial motives. Aung
Htoo, a human rights lawyer, claimed that MPs wanted to earn honorariums, allowances, privileges, and
facilities commensurate to those of Union ministers and thus sought to classify committees as “union level
organizations.” Aung Htoo, A Constitutional Crisis in Burma?, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA, Sept. 7,
2012, https://www.dvb.no/analysis/a-constitutional-crisis-in-burma/23662. He claims this would have
incurred an enormous expense given that there were thirty active Hluttaw committees at the time,
especially as some committees included non-MPs as members. Id. After impeachment, MP U Stephen of
Kengtung Constituency rejected this claim, noting that not a single MP had taken the emoluments of Union
ministers.
TOE NAING MANN, THE EXPLAINING TO THE VERDICT HANDED DOWN BY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL COURT OF THE UNION ON THE ISSUE OF UNION LEVEL ORGANIZATION 15
(2012).
271
See, e.g., MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, § 140(b) (Myan.) (providing that members of the
organization representing any Union Level Body formed under the Constitution are entitled “to explain,
converse and discuss Bills or matters relating to their Bodies when they are attending sessions of the
Committees, Commissions and Bodies of the Pyithu Hluttaw with the permission of the Head of the
Committee, Commission or Body concerned.”).
272
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, supra note 267, at 4.
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well.273 For its part, the Hluttaw noted that term was already defined in the
2010 Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law and the 2010 Pyithu and Amyotha Hluttaw
Laws as including committees or bodies formed by the legislature.274 It then
challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, alleging that the Tribunal only had
jurisdiction over laws passed by the government after the enactment of the
2008 Constitution.275
Before reaching its decision, the Constitutional Tribunal discussed
approaches of constitutional interpretation. It distinguished between the
interpretation of a statute “literally which can be availed by itself [sic]”
versus the “consideration of those provisions construed with the intention of
the drafters.” 276 It also acknowledged that the 1973 Interpretation of
Expressions Law advised consideration of the “intention and attitude” of the
drafters.277 This is the first time the Tribunal explicitly discussed methods of
constitutional interpretation, and while it did not use the labels employed by
comparative constitutional law scholars (e.g., “textualist” versus
“originalist”), it did fairly accurately summarize those schools of
constitutional thought. 278
The Tribunal combined textualist and originalist approaches to the
case. First, it noted that Chapter IV of the Constitution made separate
provisions for the formation of legislative committees. 279 Given the
separation of powers in the Constitution, the Tribunal took this to imply that
legislative committees were being treated differently and separately from
“Union Level Organizations.” 280 Then it cited National Convention
Chairman Aung Toe’s statement that the president has the authority to
“designate [] the number of members of the Union Level Organizations to be
273

Id. at 5.
The Law Relating to Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, 2010, No. 11/2010, § 2(f) (Myan.); The Law Relating
to Pyithu Hluttaw, 2010, No. 12/2010, § 2(h) (Myan.); The Law Relating to Amyotha Hluttaw, 2010, No.
13/2010, § 2(h) (Myan.).
275
Under § 322(b) of the Constitution and § 12(b) of the Constitutional Tribunal Law, one of the
functions and duties of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Union is “vetting” or “scrutinizing” whether “the
laws promulgated by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the regional hluttaw, the state hluttaw, or the SelfAdministered Division Leading Body and the Self-Administered Zone Leading Body are in conformity
with the Constitution.” See Constitutional Tribunal Law, 2010, No. 21, ch. VI, § 12(b) (Myan.) (The State
Peace and Development Council Law).
276
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 4 (Myan), reprinted in Verdict Handed
Down on Submission No. 1/2012 Submitted by Attorney-General of the Union on Behalf of the President of
the Union, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Aug. 16, 2012, at 6.
277
Id. (citing Interpretation of Expressions Law, 1973, No. 22/1973, § 4 (Myan.) (The relevant
provision reads: “In interpreting any provision of law, the proceedings of the law drafting commission or
of the legislative authority before enactment of such law the drafts of the law and the statement of objects
and reasons for enacting the law may be taken into consideration.”)).
278
Burmese does not have direct translations for the terms textualism or originalism.
279
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, supra note 276.
280
Id.
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formed under the Constitution.”281 The Tribunal interpreted this to define
“Union Level Organizations” as 1) bodies arising out of the 2008
Constitution, 2) whose members were appointed by the president, and 3)
confirmed by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.282 Therefore, the Tribunal declared
that legislative committees were not “Union Level Organizations.”
Both parties actually made policy arguments. The Attorney-General
noted that legislative committees only serve for a limited time to study
specific issues, and as such, do not rise to the level of “Union Level
Organizations.”283 By contrast, the Hluttaw pointed out that legislatures
under the previous 1947 and 1974 Constitutions had formed legislative
committees, and that allocating work to committees was an “[i]nternational
practice.”284 However, consistent with previous cases, the Tribunal did not
accept these arguments as relevant.285
5.

Mon State v. Myanmar

The Constitutional Tribunal seemed to abandon its strict
textualist/originalist approach in July 2012, when it received its first petition
from a state/regional government. 286 In Mon State v. Myanmar, the
chairman of the Mon State hluttaw asked the Tribunal to invalidate the 1993
Municipal Law.287 The Mon State hluttaw wanted to enact a new municipal
law but believed the Union legislation precluded it from doing so. It argued
that municipal governance is not covered under the Constitution’s Union
legislative list (Schedule I) but is instead included under the state/regional
legislative list (Schedule II), giving the latter exclusive jurisdiction.288 The
state claimed that the law should be rendered void under § 446, a transitional
clause allowing existing laws to remain in operation only if not contrary to
the Constitution.289 The Union Attorney-General countered that the Union
legislature would first have to amend or repeal the law.290
The Constitutional Tribunal’s decision reached several determinations.
First, it agreed that the Mon State hluttaw had jurisdiction over municipal
281
282
283
284
285
286

at 7.

287

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Constitutional Tribunal of the State Hears Enquiry, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., July 17, 2012,

Chairperson of the Mon State Hluttaw v. The Republic of the Union of Myanmar, [2012] No.
2/2012 (C.T.) 1 (Myan.) [hereinafter Mon State v. Myan.].
288
Id. at 1; see also MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, §§ 96, 188, Schedules I-II (Myan.).
289
MYAN. CONST. (2008), supra note 288, at § 446.
290
Mon State v. Myanmar, supra note 287, at 2.
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affairs.291 It then held that the transitional clause of the Constitution allowed
previous laws to remain in force until explicitly amended or repealed by the
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.292 However, the Tribunal then went on to advise that
the Union legislature should repeal the 1993 Municipal Law and authorized
the Mon State government to enact its own municipal law.293 The Tribunal
proposed a phased process whereby the various states and regions enact their
own municipal laws before the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw repeals the Union law.294
The Tribunal seemed worried about the possibility of a legal vacuum if the
Union law was repealed first. 295
The Constitutional Tribunal’s reasoning in this case is much less
textualist than its previous decisions, and perhaps not coincidentally, the
reasoning is also less clear. First, allowing the 1993 Municipal Law to
remain in force despite acknowledging its unconstitutionality effectively
reads the phrase “so far as [existing laws] are not contrary to the
Constitution” out of § 446 of the Constitution. In effect, the Tribunal
members seemed to be undertaking a balancing test, weighing the extent of
unconstitutionality against the policy implications of immediately nullifying
the law. They seemed particularly adamant in assuring the Mon State
hluttaw that it could pass its own municipal law even in the absence of
action at the Union level. However, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court’s
balancing test, the members never engaged in a thorough discussion of the
policy issues at stake. The Tribunal advised that it would be “more suitable”
for the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw to repeal the law,296 but did not set a deadline or
assess the likelihood that the other states/regions would pass their own
municipal laws soon.297
The decision was issued in July 2012, during a period when legislators
were increasingly calling for impeachment proceedings against the
Constitutional Tribunal members over the “Union Level Organizations”
case.298 The Mon State case did not receive nearly as much media attention,
but the uproar might nevertheless have made the Tribunal members more
nervous about challenging the government. Indeed, the central question
291

Id. at 5.
Id.
293
Id. at 5-6.
294
Id. at 7.
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Id.
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Id. at 5.
297
Fortunately, it appears that other states have interpreted the decision as permitting them to pass
municipal laws. Both Shan State and Kayin State had passed their own municipal laws by late 2013. See
HAMISH NIXON ET AL., STATE AND REGION GOVERNMENTS IN MYANMAR, available at http://asiafoundatio
n.org/resources/pdfs/StateandRegionGovernmentsinMyanmarCESDTAF.PDF.
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here, as in the previous case, concerned the constitutionality of laws passed
under the SLORC/SPDC. The members clearly tried very hard to realize a
pragmatic compromise in this decision, even at the expense of a strict
textualist approach to constitutional interpretation.
C.

Impeachment of the Tribunal Members

Even though in 2011 the ambiguity surrounding the Constitutional
Tribunal’s independence seemed to be an academic question, by mid-2012
the Tribunal faced an existential threat to its independence. Before March
2012, the Tribunal had received three cases and declared a Union law
unconstitutional in all of them. While the President’s Office and MPs
criticized several of the Tribunals decisions, 299 the Tribunal itself only
became a source of controversy once—albeit indirectly—when the speaker
of the Amyotha Hluttaw, Khin Aung Myint, proposed allowing the Tribunal
to conduct abstract review on draft legislation.300 Ultimately, Pyithu Hluttaw
Speaker Shwe Mann defeated this proposal, arguing that it infringed upon
the legislature’s lawmaking authority and was not necessary.301
This changed after the “Union Level Organizations” case. Amyotha
Hluttaw Deputy Speaker U Mya Nyein alleged that the Constitutional
Tribunal exceeded the scope of the Attorney General’s petition in issuing a
decision about the constitutional status of legislative committees. 302
Lawmakers seemed to have interpreted the ruling as an attempt to limit the
power of the legislature to conduct oversight activities, such as subpoenaing
government ministers. 303 Increasingly, MPs and lawyers outside the
government attacked the Tribunal’s decision as incorrect and the Tribunal
members as unqualified. 304 Given that most of the members had been
selected by the military in February 2011 and that the legislature had been
given little opportunity to review their qualifications, it is not surprising the
299

See, e.g., Decision Sparks Hluttaw Row, THE MYAN. TIMES, Nov. 7-13, 2011,
http://www.mmtimes.com/2011/news/600/news60001.html.
300
Id.
301
Pyithu Hluttaw Session Continues for 47th Day: As There Was No Disagreement on the Report,
the Hluttaw Decided to Send Back the Hluttaw Office Bill, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Nov. 15, 2011, at 1,
7.
302
Soe Than Lynn, Reps Slam Ruling on Status of Committees, THE MYAN. TIMES, Apr. 30-May 6,
2012, http://www.mmtimes.com/2012/news/624/news62415.html.
303
Id. But as Derek Tonkin, former U.K. ambassador to Thailand, points out, this does not
necessarily mean that ministers cannot be invited to testify. Derek Tonkin, U.S. – Myanmar Relations 2012,
NETWORK MYAN., http://www.networkmyanmar.org/index.php/external-relations/united-states/2012 (last
visited May 20, 2014).
304
MANN, supra note 270. The author confirmed this point in private conversations in Yangon,
Myanmar in May 2012.
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Hluttaw MPs had little invested in the members despite having nominally
appointed six of them. By April 24, the Hluttaw Joint Bill Committee had
issued a report concluding that the Constitutional Tribunal was in error and
that legislative committees were “Union Level Organizations.”305 While the
legislature went on recess soon afterward, the decision would not be
forgotten.
In early August 2012, 301 Pyithu Hluttaw MPs signed a petition to
impeach the Tribunal members. 306 Attempting to compromise, Speaker
Shwe Mann asked the Tribunal members to resign voluntarily and set a
deadline of August 21. 307 However, President Thein Sein rebuffed the
legislature’s demands and the Tribunal members remained in office after the
deadline.308 The Amyotha Hluttaw then passed a motion to impeach the
Tribunal members by a 167-56 vote, with only the military MPs opposed.309
In a vote of 447-168—noticeably more than required to support a vote of
conviction—the joint Pyidaungsu Hluttaw passed a resolution supporting
impeachment.310 The non-binding nature of the resolution was likely an
attempt to allow the Tribunal members to save face. On August 28, the
Pyithu Hluttaw formed a fifteen-member committee to investigate the
charges.311 MPs claimed that the Tribunal had violated the 2008 Constitution
by reaching an incorrect decision.312 Soon afterward, the legislature also
filed formal impeachment charges.313 On September 6, all nine Tribunal
members resigned.314
305

Lynn, supra note 302.
Speaker Requests Patience of Parliamentarian; Row over Union Level Organization Definition to
be Sent to President, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Aug. 15, 2012, at 9; see also Kyaw Phone Kyaw, Burma's
Constitutional Tribunal Members Should Resign: Shwe Mann, MIZZIMA NEWS, Aug. 15, 2012,
http://mizzimaenglish.blogspot.com/2012/08/burmas-constitutional-tribunal-members.html.
307
Speaker Requests Patience of Parliamentarian; Row over Union Level Organization Definition to
Be Sent to President, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Aug. 15, 2012, at 16.
308
Will the Burmese Parliament Impeach the Constitutional Tribunal? MIZZIMA NEWS, Aug. 22,
2012, http://www.bnionline.net/index.php/news/mizzima/13575-will-the-burmese-parliament-impeach-theconstitutional-tribunal-.html.
309
Soe Than Lynn & Win Ko Ko Latt, Reps Move Towards Impeachment, THE MYAN. TIMES, Aug.
27-Sept. 2, 2012, http://www.mmtimes.com/2012/news/641/news01.html.
310
Xinhua, Myanmar Parliament Passes Resolution over Constitutional Tribunal Decision Dispute,
GLOBAL TIMES, Aug. 27, 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/729370.shtml.
311
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Has Power to Issue Orders Regarding Administration, NEW LIGHT OF MYAN.,
Aug. 30, 2012, at 9. Just before they resigned, the Tribunal members complained that the Hluttaw
members on the committee suffered from a conflict of interest because they had also been involved in the
vote for impeachment. Remonstration of Chairman of Investigation Board U Thein Swe and Members,
NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Sept. 4, 2012, at 7.
312
Lynn & Latt, supra note 309.
313
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Has Power to Issue Orders Regarding Administration, supra note 311.
314
Republic of the Union of Myanmar Office of the President, Resignations of Chairman and
Members of Constitutional Tribunal of the Union Allowed, 2012, Order No. 29/2012 (Myan.), reprinted in
THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Sept. 6, 2012, at 1.
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The factions in the impeachment debate defied many predictions of
how Myanmar’s young democracy would operate.315 On one hand, most of
the opposition parties, including the NLD, joined the USDP majority in
supporting impeachment. 316 The main political parties had come to a
consensus over the issue.317 On the other side, the president and military
MPs opposed impeachment.318 This led some observers to claim that the
dispute represented a divide between “reformers” and “conservatives.”319
However, the Tribunal’s reasoning in the “Union Level Organizations” case
was not patently a breach of the Constitution, as some MPs claimed.320 The
president, while sometimes frustrated at the pace of lawmaking, had not
made any reactionary moves against the legislature. The military tended to
refrain from overt politicking; the Tribunal impeachment was one of the few
times MPs voted as a bloc against a clear majority of the civilian
politicians.321
Rather, the impeachment drive reflected the legislature’s desire to
protect its hard-won power. Just a year before, the legislature had widely
been expected to act as a “rubber stamp.” Many MPs saw the Tribunal’s
decision, and constitutional review more broadly, as an encroachment into
their legislative prerogative.322 The fall 2011 debate about granting the
Tribunal abstract review over draft legislation prefigured the impeachment
saga when Speaker Shwe Mann insisted that the Hluttaw had a monopoly
over lawmaking.323 Surprisingly, the legislature and the public at large rarely

315

Including in Nardi, supra note 176, at 25-27, where the author predicted that the Tribunal would
realize that their independence was limited and thus would not challenge the legislature. When it did so,
the backlash was inevitable.
316
Will the Burmese Parliament Impeach the Constitutional Tribunal?, supra note 308. In fact, U Ye
Tun, the Pyithu Hluttaw MP who had initially suggested impeachment to Speaker Shwe Mann, was a
member of the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party. See Ye Tun, Why I Opposed Tribunal Law Changes,
THE MYAN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/in-depth/3581-why-i-opposedtribunal-law-changes.html.
317
Will the Burmese Parliament impeach the Constitutional Tribunal?, supra note 308.
318
Lynn & Latt, supra note 309.
319
Gwen Robinson, Myanmar at Risk of Constitutional Crisis, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012,
http://www.
ft.com/intl/cms/s/27b49c54-f38e-11e1-b3a2-00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?_i_location= http%3A%
2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F27b4#axzz2s8T5NcEp.
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Lynn & Latt, supra note 309; MANN, supra note 270, at 7.
321
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 178, at 7.
322
Lawi Weng, Constitutional Tribunal Dispute Heats Up, THE IRRAWADDY, Aug. 21, 2012,
http://www.irrawaddy.org/thein-sein/constitutional-tribunal-dispute-heats-up.html;
Nyein
Nyein,
Constitutional Tribunal Could Face Impeachment, THE IRRAWADDY, Aug. 16, 2012,
http://www.irrawaddy.org/shwe-mann/constitutional-tribunal-could-face-impeachment.html.
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See infra Part III.A.
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discussed the legal reasoning in the “union level organizations” decision.324
Allegedly, most MPs had not even bothered to read the decision.325
Before appointing new Constitutional Tribunal members, the
government took the opportunity to amend the Constitutional Tribunal
Law.326 First, the amendments require Tribunal members to report to the
president, the Pyithu Hluttaw speaker, and the Amyotha Hluttaw speaker.327
Second, the amendments could undermine the finality of Tribunal decisions
because the text of the law can now be read as acknowledging only cases
appealed through the ordinary courts (under § 323) as final.328 The new law
also granted the legislature rather than the president authority to select the
Chairperson of the Tribunal,329 even though this contradicts the text of the
Constitution.330
The government finally appointed new Constitutional Tribunal
members on February 21, 2013. 331 Since the impeachment crisis, the
324

One notable exception was the staff at The Myanmar Times, which published several articles and
op-eds calling for a compromise. Thomas Kean, Compromise Needed on Tribunal, Hluttaw Rift, THE
MYAN. TIMES, Sept. 3-9, 2012, http://www.mmtimes.com/2012/news/642/news02.html.
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Interview with Anonymous, in Yangon, Myanmar (May 2013). U Ye Tun, the MP who had
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own. Interview with Anonymous, in Yangon, Myanmar (Dec. 2013).
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Bill Amending the Constitutional Tribunal Law Discussed, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Nov. 16,
2012, at 9, 16.
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Ye Tun, Why I Opposed Tribunal Law Changes, THE MYAN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012,
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Id.; see also Const. Trib. Amend. Law, supra note 327, at § 12(g) -§ 24.
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Final Resolution May Cause More Problems, THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Jan. 15, 2013, at 16.
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MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. VI, § 321 (Myan.). In commenting on the draft law, the
President attempted to point this out but the Hluttaw overrode his objections. Constitutional Tribunal Will
Have to Settle Many Disputes in the Future Lack of Power to Pass Final Resolution May Cause More
Problems, supra note 329, at 16; see also Soe Than Lynn, MPs Ignore President on Tribunal Law Changes,
THE MYAN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2013, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/nay-pyi-taw/3851mps-ignore-president-on-tribunal-law-changes.html.
331
Republic of the Union of Myanmar Office of the President, Appointment of Chairman and
Members of Constitutional Tribunal of the Union, 2013, Order No. 12/2013 (Feb. 26, 2013) (Myan.),
reprinted in THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., Feb. 26, 2013, at 1; see also Win Naung Toe, Burma MPs Nominate
Constitutional Court Chief, RADIO FREE ASIA, Feb. 21 2013, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/
constitutional-tribunal-02212013175458.html. The new members are:
U Myint Win (Retired Attorney-General’s Office Deputy Director-General);
U Than Kyaw (Legal Advisor to the President);
Daw Hla Myo Nwe (Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs);
U Mya Thein (Retired Director-General of the Union Supreme Court);
U Mya Thein (Notary Public Advocate and Supreme Court advocate);
U Myint Lwin (Notary Public Advocate and Supreme Court advocate);
U Tin Myint (Retired Director-General of Union Attorney-General’s Office);
Daw Kyin San (Retired Deputy Director-General of Union Attorney-General’s Office);
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Tribunal has received no further petitions,332 although on January 30 the
president indicated that he might submit eight recently passed laws for
review.333
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES

This Part considers several interrelated questions about the Myanmar
Constitutional Tribunal’s use of jurisprudence. First, did the Tribunal
develop a clear jurisprudential approach to constitutional interpretation?
Second, was textualism/originalism appropriate for the Constitutional
Tribunal given Myanmar’s political situation, as opposed to living
constitutionalist or proportionality approaches? Finally, what effect—if
any—did that choice have on the Tribunal’s relationship with the legislature
and the subsequent impeachment imbroglio?
A.

The Development of Tribunal Jurisprudence

The Constitutional Tribunal only issued five decisions, so the sample
of cases remains small. Nevertheless, a few trends seem clear. In President
v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw the Tribunal identified textualist and originalist
approaches to constitutional interpretation,334 suggesting that it accepted both
as legitimate. The Tribunal relied heavily on textualist methods of
constitutional interpretation during its first year. 335 Although the 2008
Constitution is not Myanmar’s first constitution, in Chief Justice v. MHA and
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw the Tribunal rejected the use of historical
precedent in interpreting constitutional provisions.336 It declared that prior
practice was not relevant as the 2008 Constitution had changed the legal
framework of the country.337
U Myo Chit (Retired Director of the Union Attorney-General’s Office).
Sandar Win, No Work for New Tribunal, THE MYAN. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2013, http://www.mmtimes.
com/index.php/national-news/6599-no-work-for-new-tribunal.html.
333
The laws that might be challenged include the 2014 Anti-Corruption Law and the Farmers’ Rights
Protection Law, as well as amended versions of the Pyithu Hluttaw Law, Amyotha Hluttaw Law,
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law, Region and State Hluttaw Law, Union Auditor General’s Office Law, and
Constitutional Tribunal Law. Sandar Win, President to Test New Constitutional Tribunal with Eight Laws,
THE MYAN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/9400-president-totest-new-constitutional-tribunal-with-eight-laws.html; see also Soe Than Lynn, Committee Slams President
Over Criticism, THE MYAN. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2013, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/
7964 -committee-slams-president-over-criticism.html.
334
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 6 (Myan).
335
See generally Chief Justice v. MHA [2011] No. 1/2011 (C.T.) (Myan.) and Dr. Aye Maung v.
Myan., [2011] No. 2/2011 (C.T.) (Myan.).
336
See Chief Justice v. MHA, supra note 335, at 33.
337
See id.
332
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By contrast, the Constitutional Tribunal frequently cited the drafting
history of the 2008 Constitution, as represented in the National Convention
proceedings. 338 The Tribunal members clarified that they would only
consider the original understanding of the Constitution at the time of the
drafting; they would not reinterpret the drafters’ intent through subsequent
legislation or political developments.339 In President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw,
the National Convention proceedings even took precedence over existing
laws that purported to define “union-level organizations.”340 Paradoxically,
the authoritarian nature of the National Convention might have helped make
the 2008 Constitution more amenable to originalist approaches. Unlike the
American Federalist Papers, which contain competing arguments from
Federalists and Anti-Federalists, 341 the National Convention proceedings
required all speeches to conform to the chairman’s program.342
For its first four decisions, the Constitutional Tribunal never relied
upon any sources other than the text of the 2008 Constitution and the
National Convention proceedings. It never discussed the dramatic political
reforms that had occurred after the 2010 elections, or if the Tribunal ought to
“update” the Constitution in order to account for these changes. The closest
the Tribunal came to making a living constitutionalist argument was in Dr.
Aye Maung v. Myanmar, when it mentioned that the Constitution promoted
the participation of ethnic minorities.343 However, it merely used text from
one part of the Constitution—§ 17(c)—to inform its interpretation of another
part. 344 It never argued that ethnic minorities should have greater
representation as a matter of legal fairness or to fulfill the expectations of a
“free and democratic society.”345 Nor did it refer to the military’s ongoing
civil war with ethnic insurgent groups as a pressing policy justification for
affording National Races Affairs Ministers the same status as other

338

See generally Dr. Aye Maung v. Myan., supra note 335, and President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw,
supra note 334.
339
See id.
340
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 6 (Myan).
341
Compare The Federalist No. 78-83 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that judges should have life
tenure because the judiciary is the weakest branch of government) with Brutus No. 11-12 & 15 (Brutus)
(arguing that independent courts with the power of constitutional review would usurp the authority of other
branches of government). See also HERBERT STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1981).
342
FINK, supra note 97, at 74-77.
343
Dr. Aye Maung v. Myan., [2011] No. 2/2011 (C.T.) 76 (Myan.).
344
Id.
345
As required by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 1
(U.K.).
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ministers. The Tribunal only made reference to broader policy concerns in
Mon State v. Myanmar, but even then only indirectly.346
B.

The Impact of Tribunal Jurisprudence on the Impeachment

The proximate cause of the legislature’s drive to impeach the
Constitutional Tribunal members was its displeasure with the President v.
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw decision.347 The impeachment crisis was a complex
event involving a wide array of political interests; without internal
memoranda from the key players, it is impossible to pinpoint the exact
motivations of the key players. However, as discussed in Section II,
throughout Myanmar’s history, political elites have been uncomfortable with
constitutionalism and separation of powers. With the brief exception of the
1947 Constitution, constitutional review had never served as a check on
government power. Under the SPDC, senior military leaders—including
Thein Sein—lectured judges about the need to cooperate with the rest of
government. 348 As such, by delineating and limiting legislative power,
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw touched upon sensitive issues for
Myanmar’s political elite.
The Constitutional Tribunal’s early textualist/originalist approach was
laudably bold and unyielding, but failed to acclimate political elites to the
new reality constitutional review—especially so soon after a guarded
political transition from military rule. Perhaps more importantly, the
Tribunal’s approach was risky given its uniquely precarious independence.
Political elites had not demonstrated a marked hostility towards judicial
independence since the transition. Indeed, soon after the impeachment, both
Speaker Shwe Mann and Aung San Suu Kyi reiterated their support for
judicial independence. 349 Their statements are not necessarily hypocritical;
as noted in Part IV.A of this article, the 2008 Constitution is ambiguous
346

See Mon State v. Myan, [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 1 (Myan.).
See Lynn & Latt, supra note 309.
348
Judgments Passed by Court Must be Free From Corruption and Should be a Salutary Lesson,
XVII(27) THE NEW LIGHT OF MYAN., May 13, 2009, at 8 & 16. For example, then-Prime Minister Thein
Sein admonished judges that “administrative and judicial systems cannot operate separately but need to be
in harmony to be able to protect public interests.” Id. His predecessor, Prime Minister Soe Win,
expressed similar sentiments: “ [J]udges should realize with vision [sic] that the bureaucratic mind that
serves the interest of only a few will be against the new system . . . It is necessary to have political as
well as judicial views.” Judicial Sector to Adapt itself to Reforms Made in Conformity with Forthcoming
State Constitution: People Will Loath Courts if Latter Apply Pressures and Not Protect Them: Prime
Minister General Soe Win Meets State/Division Judges and State/Division Law Officers, THE NEW LIGHT
OF MYAN., Feb. 6, 2007, at 1, 8.
349
See Sandar Lwin, Hluttaw Speaker Promises Independence for Judiciary, THE MYAN. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2012, http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/1754-hluttaw-speaker-promisesindependence- for-judiciary.html.
347
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regarding the extent to which judicial independence covers the Tribunal.
Therefore, it is possible that they support independence for the ordinary
courts, but not for the Tribunal.
In short, the Tribunal was in a political situation that demanded some
degree of pragmatism. 350 There are different approaches to political
pragmatism in constitutional interpretation. In the celebrated case Marbury
v. Madison, the U.S. Supreme Court simultaneously assumed the power of
judicial review while at the same time imposing limits on its jurisdiction.351
In Indonesia, the Constitutional Court sometimes attempted to soften the
impact of its decisions by announcing that the holding only applied in future
cases or by allowing the government to remedy the constitutional harm on
its own. 352 The Court even developed the doctrine of “conditional
constitutionality” in which laws can remain constitutional so long as
implemented in a manner the court thinks appropriate.353 While the Court’s
decisions have frequently angered legislators354 and prompted an attempt to
circumscribe the court’s jurisdiction,355 the Court succeeded in defeating
those attempts.356 In short, the justices’ pragmatic use of jurisprudence
350

Indeed, few observers had predicted that the Tribunal would end up issuing bold decisions against
political elites precisely because of its institutional weaknesses. Nardi, supra note 176.
351
In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), the U.S. Supreme Court found that it had the power to
exercise constitutional review over federal legislation even though Article III of the U.S. Constitution does
not explicitly grant this power to the court—unlike Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution. The decision is often
praised as a politically astute compromise in which Chief Justice John Marshall usurped the power of
judicial review while at the same time using that power to strike down a law that purported to expand the
court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Epstein & Knight, supra note 1, at 98. It has since become popular for
scholars to recommend that other new constitutional courts expand their own political power through such
compromise decisions. See, e.g., Tahirah Lee, Exporting Judicial Review from the United States to China,
19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 152 (2005).
352
Simon Butt, Indonesia's Constitutional Court: Conservative Activist or Strategic Operator?, in
THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA 98, 108-110 (Björn Dressel ed., 2012); see also Marcus
Mietzner, Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role of the
Constitutional Court at 1, 10 J. OF EAST ASIAN STUD. 397 (2010); Björn Dressel & Marcus Mietzner, A
Tale of Two Courts: The Judicialization of Electoral Politics in Asia, 25 GOVERNANCE 391 (2012);
Philippa Venning, Determination of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by the Indonesian Constitutional
Court, 10 AUSTL. J. OF ASIAN L. 100 (2008).
353
See Simon Butt, Conditional Constitutionality, Pragmatism and the Rule of Law, (Sydney Law
School Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 09/28, 2009).
354
Even constitutional law scholars worry that the Court’s “conditionally constitutional” doctrine
makes it more of a positive legislator rather than adjudicator. See Butt, supra note 352, at 110. Also, as
chief justice, Mohammad Mahfud MD frequently made public comments critical of the government. See,
e.g., Camelia Pasandaran, Palace Anger Over Mahfud’s Statement, THE JAKARTA GLOBE, June 22, 2011,
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/palace-anger-over-mahfuds-statement/448561/.
355
Anita Rachman & Ulma Haryanto, Constitutional Court Powers Rolled Back With Revision, THE
JAKARTA GLOBE, June 22, 2011, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/constitutional-court-powersrolled-back-with-revision/448324/.
356
Ina Parlina, Justices Restore Court’s Power, THE JAKARTA POST, Oct. 19, 2011,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/10/19/justices-restore-court-s-power.html.
Ironically, the
justices declared the law circumscribing the court’s jurisdiction to be unconstitutional. Id.

JUNE 2014

FINDING JUSTICE SCALIA IN BURMA

677

enabled them to make important policy decisions without triggering calls for
impeachment.357
Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal adopted pragmatism in its
decision in Mon State v. Myanmar, when it refused to strike down the 1993
Municipal Law despite its alleged unconstitutionality.358 The decision was
motivated in part by the desire to avoid a legal void were it to strike a
national law down without state or regional legislation to replace it. 359
However, by July 2012, there were already rumors of impeaching the
Tribunal members. 360 If the Tribunal’s shift towards pragmatism was
designed to appease the legislature, it was too late. Moreover, striking down
the municipal law would have imposed a relatively small burden on the
legislature compared to the “union level organizations” decision. Indeed, it
is in cases that deal with the core interests of political elites that
constitutional courts need to be most pragmatic.
Although the Constitutional Tribunal noted (correctly) that the 2008
Constitution authorized it to “vet” laws,361 it might have benefitted from
spending more time justifying that authority. For example, in its decisions,
the Tribunal never explicitly explains its theory of constitutional
interpretation or when it would defer to the legislature’s interpretation of the
Constitution. It only mentions theories of interpretation in its third decision,
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw,362 but the Tribunal never discusses how
this affected its discretion. In the U.S., Supreme Court Justices Breyer and
Scalia, otherwise on opposite sides of the debate over constitutional
interpretation, both take great care to explain how their method of
interpretation respects Congress’ lawmaking authority by constraining the

357

The analogy between Indonesia and Myanmar is not perfect. Democracy had become more firmly
entrenched in Indonesia by 2004, when the Constitutional Court issued its first controversial decisions.
However, the Indonesian political elite remains relatively hostile to deeper liberalization and has even
attempted to rollback some reforms. Marcus Mietzner, Indonesia’s Democratic Stagnation: Anti-reformist
Elites and Resilient Civil Society, 19 DEMOCRATIZATION 209 (2011). Impeachment might have been more
difficult in Indonesia, but not impossible. Constitutional Court justices can be dishonorably discharged for
“commission of an act of misconduct” by the president upon recommendation of the chief justice.
Constitutional Court Law, 2003, No. 24/2003, ch. IV, art. 23, § 2(b) (Myan). However, the procedure for
the removal of justices is contained in the 2003 Constitutional Court Law, not § 24C of the 1945
Constitution, meaning that the legislature could have amended it at any point. Again, the fact that the
legislature did not even apparently consider doing this is partly due to the court’s success in moderating the
fallout of its decisions.
358
See Mon State v. Myan., [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 5-6 (Myan.).
359
Id.
360
Indeed, the author had heard reports that the Hluttaw would face impeachment as early as May
2012.
361
See, e.g., President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, [2012] No. 2/2012 (C.T.) 5 (Myan).
362
Id.
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court’s discretion. 363 By contrast, Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal did
little to assuage legislators’ fears that it would act as an unaccountable check
on the legislature.
C.

Possible Options for Constitutional Tribunal Jurisprudence

While a more pragmatic approach might have mitigated confrontation
between Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal and the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw,
the ultimate question still remains: were textualist/originalist approaches
simply ill-suited to the political situation confronting the members? Upon
assuming office, the Constitutional Tribunal members faced several unique
challenges. First, Myanmar’s political elites were not used to being
constrained by constitutional limitations on their power. Second, the 2008
Constitution lacked legitimacy, so there was a real risk some political
stakeholders would refuse to accept the legitimacy of Tribunal decisions.364
The members needed to quickly establish that the document was legitimate
and binding. Moreover, they needed to establish that the 2008 Constitution
had value as the source of their rulings.
The Constitutional Tribunal members primarily had two
jurisprudential options to bolster their legitimacy as arbiters of the
constitution. First, they could have pursued a strict textualist/originalist
approach to reaffirm the legitimacy of the 2008 Constitution as
promulgated—the approach they ended up taking. Alternatively, the
members could have attempted to “update” the Constitution through a more
flexible method of interpretation. One risk with the latter approach is that it
might have laid bare underlying concerns about the legitimacy of the
Constitution. Moreover, it might have created the impression that the
members were engaging in lawmaking rather than judging. 365 A textual
approach might have seemed more secure and more appropriate to a
“judicial” body. However, the Tribunal’s approach to constitutional
interpretation did not mitigate—and, if anything, seems to have
exacerbated—the crisis over the “union level organizations” case.
By contrast, a balancing or proportionality approach might have
allowed the Constitutional Tribunal to show greater deference to the
legislature, while reaching the same legal outcomes. Balancing and
proportionality tests differ in details but generally require judges to weigh
363

Compare with BREYER, supra note 24, and SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 24.
C.f., James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
343 (1998) (discussing the relationship between the legitimacy of individual cases and the legitimacy of
courts as institutions).
365
C.f., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 24.
364
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competing arguments and interests. Unlike a textualist approach, weighing
does not simply declare one side “incorrect” but rather acknowledges
legitimate interests both sides possess and then determines which has the
stronger constitutional claim. 366 In theory, in Chief Justice v. MHA, the
Constitutional Tribunal could have discussed the conditions under which the
Constitution allows the executive to limit judicial independence rather than
treat judicial independence as an absolute.367 Such an analysis might still
have concluded that appointing administrative officials simply to expedite
case processing would not have constituted a sufficiently compelling
objective or least restrictive means. However, it would also have
acknowledged the ministry’s policy arguments as reasonable, perhaps
mitigating the tensions between the government and Tribunal.368
The Constitutional Tribunal’s originalist approach was particularly
risky given the speed at which Myanmar’s political reforms were occurring.
The détente between President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi had
already occurred by late 2011, just after the Tribunal published its first
decision.369 Under Shwe Mann, the legislature had become increasingly
active. Some critics argue that the Tribunal should have taken greater
cognizance of these developments. 370 Many of the assumptions and
expectations at the time the 2008 Constitution was drafted appeared
outdated, at best. After all, during the National Convention, many observers
had assumed the legislature would be a “rubber stamp.” 371 A “living
constitutionalist” approach might have prompted the Constitutional Tribunal
to consider if contemporary norms and developments necessitated a
366

See Sweet & Mathews, supra note 46, at 12.
Again, recognizing the ambiguity in § 11(a) of the 2008 Constitution, which only promises
judicial independence “to the extent possible.” MYAN. CONST. (2008), May 29, 2008, ch. I, § 11(a).
(Myan.).
368
Ironically, the Constitutional Tribunal members did not use the Chief Justice v. MHA case to
justify the Tribunal’s own independence. While the decision referred to judicial independence for the
ordinary courts, Chief Justice v. MHA [2011] No. 1/2011 (C.T.) (Myan.),] at 45, it never explicitly
extended the principle to the Tribunal. This is in marked contrast to Indonesia’s Constitutional Court.
When the Indonesian Supreme Court challenged the power of the Judicial Commission to discipline judges
for ethics violations, the Constitutional Court ruled that the commission’s power violated the constitutional
principle of judicial independence. It then explicitly extended the ruling to cover itself, even though no
constitutional court judges were implicated in the case. Supreme Court v. Judicial Commission, [2006]
005/PUU-IV/2006 (Indon.); see also Simon Butt, The Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Dispute
Between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission: Banishing Judicial Accountability? (Sydney
Law School Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 09/31, 2009).
369
See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 183.
370
See, e.g., Nathan Willis, The Constitutional Tribunal of Myanmar and the Rule of Law, (draft on
file with author) (arguing that a “substantive rule of law” approach might have compelled the Tribunal to
consider the nature of the 2008 Constitution and how it was adopted, leading to a more flexible
jurisprudence).
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rethinking of how to interpret constitutional ambiguities. For example, in
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, living constitutionalism might have led the
members to consider how the increased prominence of legislative
committees affected their constitutional status. It might also have discussed
how depriving committees of “union level organization” status would affect
their work.
The Constitutional Tribunal’s approach to constitutional interpretation
might also have inadvertently infused its decisions with an overly critical
tone. In each of the first four cases, textualist and originalist approaches led
the Tribunal to definitively declare that either the president or the Hluttaw
was incorrect. More importantly, although the Tribunal’s decision did
reiterate each side’s arguments, originalism gave it little room to
acknowledge the arguments and interests of the losing side. For example, in
President v. Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the Tribunal claimed that the National
Convention proceedings “obviously stated” that legislative committees were
not “union level organizations,”372 despite the fact that many MPs did not
think it so obvious. Later, some MPs complained the Tribunal demonstrated
a lack of respect373—especially worrisome because Burmese political culture
still expect youths and subordinates to defer to their elders.374
VI.

CONCLUSION

The question of how Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal interprets the
2008 Constitution will become even more important during the latter half of
2014. President Thein Sein has already signaled his intent to challenge eight
new laws before the Tribunal. In addition, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw is
preparing to propose amendments to the constitution, some of which will
likely lead to new constitutional disputes. The new Tribunal members will
need to decide how much of their predecessors’ jurisprudential reasoning to
adopt. Will they pursue a similar originalist approach or pursue a different
direction? The members will also need to think strategically about how to
avoid a confrontation with the legislature given that the 2012 impeachment
shows they cannot win a showdown. It would be unfortunate if the members
decided to alter their outcomes to appease political elites. Rather, a more
viable alternative would be to think carefully about the choice of
interpretative methodology and how it would affect the legislature’s
reaction.
372
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For its part, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw should consider a package of
constitutional amendments that would establish a standard of constitutional
interpretation for the Constitutional Tribunal. However, in doing so, it
should adopt a realistic standard that reflects its interests and by which it can
commit to abide in future disputes. If it wants the Tribunal to weigh ethical
and policy considerations, it could consider a flexible balancing test. Such a
move would not be unprecedented, as governments around the world have
incorporated proportionality tests directly into their constitutions.
Alternatively, if the legislature worries that the Tribunal might usurp its
lawmaking authority then it should impose a deferential standard. Several
constitutions actually include clauses permitting legislatures to pass
unconstitutional laws so long as they meet certain conditions for a limited
duration of time.375 Several constitutions incorporate both types of standards,
granting judges discretion but also preventing them from acting as an undue
constraint. 376 Adopting a clear standard would help make constitutional
review less threatening to political elites by guiding the Tribunal down
acceptable paths.
The Hluttaw should also pass legislation clarifying the grounds for
impeaching Constitutional Tribunal members. Impeachment is a crucial tool
for enhancing judicial accountability and reducing judicial corruption,377 but
if left vague it could also chill the Tribunal into submission. MPs justified
impeachment as necessary because the Tribunal had “breached” the
Constitution.378 However, § 33 of the Constitutional Tribunal Law states that
members cannot be impeached for actions taken in “good faith”379 and
supporters of impeachment had not furnished any proof of bad faith. The
term “good faith” itself is not defined in the law. Does it include decisions
motivated by partisan preferences—something alleged to occur regularly on
the U.S. Supreme Court?380 When does issuing a legally unsound decision
rise to the level of “breaching” the Constitution? Further defining these
terms would at least help guide future Tribunal members avoid destructive
showdowns.
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See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, §§ 1 & 32(2) (U.K.).
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Ultimately, the experience of Myanmar’s Constitutional Tribunal does
not imply that textualist or originalist approaches to constitutional
interpretation are inherently unsuited for constitutional courts in
transitioning democracies. The situation in Myanmar is too unique to draw
such a broad conclusion. Other factors, such as the strategic acumen of the
court’s leadership, affect the outcome of constitutional crises. However, this
article argues that the method of constitutional interpretation can and does
affect the relationship between courts and the other branches of government.
Some methods of interpretation lend themselves more easily to weighing
non-legal factors, such as political and social developments, which might be
necessary in a rapidly changing political context. Textualist and originalist
methods in particular risk framing cases as zero-sum games, which could
increase tension between the judiciary and the other branches of
government.

